Sir Peter Francis Strawson (1919–2006) is a seminal figure in twentieth‐century analytic philosophy. By his own account, Strawson authored two papers that effectively embody all that he had to say about moral philosophy (2008: xxvii). One of those papers (1961) is rarely read and little discussed. The other (1962) is a widely read agenda‐setting work that continues to shape debates about free will ( see Free Will) and responsibility ( see Responsibility).

it is plausible that being an evil person is a matter of having a particularly morally depraved character. i argue that suffering from extreme moral vices-and not consistently lacking moral vices, for example-suffices for being evil. alternatively, i defend an extremity account concerning evil personhood against consistency accounts of evil personhood. after clarifying what it is for vices to be extreme, i note that the extremity thesis i defend allows that a person could suffer from both extremely vicious character traits while possessing some modest virtue as well. By contrast, consistency theses rule out this possibility by definition. this result does not suggest that extremity accounts are flawed, however, since, as i argue, the thesis that evil people must lack moral virtue altogether effectively defines evil people out of existence and prematurely privileges skepticism about evil personhood. Ultimately, i contend that an extremity account is most consistent with common intuitions about putative evil persons as well as plausible assumptions about aretaic evaluations of character quite generally. the main fallacy which prevents people from recognizing potential Hitlers before they have shown their true faces. .. lies in the belief that a thoroughly destructive and evil man must be a devil-and look his part; that he must be devoid of any positive quality; that he must bear the sign of Cain.. .. There is hardly a man who is utterly devoid of any kindness, of any good intentions.. .. Hence, as long as one believes that the evil man wears horns, one will not discover an evil man.-erich Fromm (1973, 432) i. intrODUCtiOn ny plausible account of evil personhood must take seriously the above observation that many evildoers, even the perpetrators of great atrocities, are in some

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Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility-that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain.

There is a decided consensus that Kantian ethics yields an absolutist case against torture – that torture is morally wrong and absolutely so. I argue that while there is a Kantian case against torture, Kantian ethics does not clearly entail absolutism about torture. I consider several arguments for a Kantian absolutist position concerning torture and explain why none are sound. I close by clarifying just what the Kantian case against torture is. My contention is that while Kantian ethics does not support a variety of moral absolutism about torture, it does suggest a strong version of legal absolutism.