In this study, we explicate citing behavior in the writing of scientific papers by presenting a taxonomy of motives to cite. The suggested taxonomy consists of four main categories, which are purely descriptive: Argumentation, Social Alignment, Mercantile Alignment, and Data. These categories are divided into a suggested set of subcategories. We argue that the complexities of citing practice show how little can be assumed about actual citing behavior when studying a finished paper. The discussion supports the claim that it might be misleading to treat all citations as equal in quantitative citation analysis.

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PeterErlandson peter.erlandson@hb.seThere are two sides to the concept of ambivalence. One concerns contradictory attitudes, expressions or feelings that are simultaneously directed toward an object, person or action, the other concerns undecidability and a fluctuation of meaning between a thing and its opposite. Both of them concern an aspect of uncertainty. In this article we argue that reflection and reflection projects are caught up within ambiguity between two discourses on human thinking and action: one which conceives humans as rational intellectual beings who elaborate practical actions by following certain procedures and one where human practice is changeable, complex and follows its own logic (or rather un-logic). These discourses have different genealogies and social agendas. However, they also meet, not only in different reflection projects in education but also in classical reflection texts. The example we are going to use to illustrate this is Schön's The reflective practitioner. We claim that the discursive struggle over reflection makes the theoretical basis for the reflection projects confusing and even fragile, as well as potentially dynamic, creative and productive.

Shortly after the publication of The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and the sequel Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987) ‘reflection‐in‐action’ became a major concept in teacher education. The concept has, however, been criticised on ontological/epistemological as well as practice oriented accounts (Van Manen, 1995; Newman, 1999; Erlandson, 1995). In this paper I argue that reflection‐in‐action is a theoretical construction that snatches the interacting, working, and producing bodies from their practices, and consequently, matters of politics, of discipline, of institutional interaction and of the workings of social categories are reduced to matters of thinking. Turning to Foucault (1991) I claim that the doctrine of reflection is interwoven in the logic of discipline.

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