We present evidence suggesting that the widely used regression method for testing budgetary incrementalism (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1966a, 1966b, 1971 is not suited for U.S. budgetary data that appear to be nonstationary. The method, moreover, cannot detect a nonincremental period following (or preceding) an incremental period. We offer an alternative method that is valid even in nonstationary cases. Our method exploits both the crosssectional and time-series characteristics of the budgetary data to identify statistically the occurrence of incremental decisions (counts) and to estimate incremental cycles for various agencies. More important, the method lends itself to explanatory hypotheses testing. We formulate a set of hypotheses about how various political and economic factors may affect incremental budgeting. We test these hypotheses using the estimated counts in a Poisson regression context. Our results suggest that the Democrats' control over the political process, a switch in the party controlling the White House or Congress, and presidential election year promises (and political vulnerabilities) all cause departures from incremental budgeting. The public pressure resulting from a persistently large deficit has a similar effect. This work may contribute to our understanding of legislative choice.

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This essay ascertains some general conditions for equivalence and nonequivalence among six election objectives: 01, maximizing expected plurality; 02, maximizing proportion of expected vote; 02, maximizing expected vote; 04, maximizing probability that plurality exceeds some level; 05, maximizing probability that proportion of vote exceeds some level; 06, maximizing probability that vote exceeds some level. The major findings are these: (1) 01, 02, and 03 are equivalent if the election is zero-sum-like in expected vote; (2) 01 and 02 are equivalent if competition is strongly symmetric. A necessary condition for this equivalence is also presented for 2-candidate elections: (3) 01 and 04 are equivalent, as are 03 and 06, if the candidate's forecasting error is independent of all strategies; (4) 01 and 04 are equivalent for two-candidate elections, and for n-candidate elections 02 and 05 are equivalent, as are 03 and 06, if the distribution of a candidate's forecasting error is multivariate normal, and if the level of plurality, proportion, or vote to be exceeded is the minimax value of the election game under 01, 02, or 03; (5) findings of equivalence and nonequivalence depend upon the definition of equivalence (findings 1 and 2 rely upon an election with all candidates at equilibrium strategies, while findings 3 and 4 do not); (6) equivalence and nonequivalence among election objectives may be sensitive to the candidate's attitude toward risk, i.e., to the functional form of his utility function in pluraliy, vote proportion, or vote; election objectives depend on information, competitive environment, and constitutional arrangements. Hence, statements of preference for alternative election systems, laws, and reforms perforce entail reasonable theoretical expectations about the way in which these systems, laws, and reforms affect the candidates' campaign objectives, as well as about equivalence and nonequivalence among these objectives.

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Central economic planning traditionally has set goals and allocated resources by supplanting the price system with central direction. Planners engaged in industry-by-industry and firn-by-firm decision making, all to achieve predetermined targets. The neoclassical approach to law and economics posits that common lawjudges engage in a similaractivity, in rendering decisions that maximize wealth. A significant feature of this approach is the dacement of iudges in the msition of calculators of com~arative values. Neither --advocates of central planning nor those of judicial wealth maximizing address or solve the economic calculation ~roblem. The various aspects of that problem hold two imdicationsfor common lawjudges. First, they cannot accomplish the tasks that theneoclassical approach sets oul for them. Second, a recognition of the calculation problem leads to a rejection of balancing and the choice of rights-based, bright-line rules that return actual and potential litigants' decisions to the market.