In a recent article, James Fearon advances an innovative approach to the study of interstate crises. He adds to the traditional view (that crisis outcomes are influenced by the balance of capability and the balance of resolve) the notion that domestic political audiences exert a strong influence over which state in a crisis is likely to achieve a successful outcome. His game-theoretic analysis yields a number of interesting hypotheses, which are tested in this study using data on militarized disputes, the structure of polities, and national capability. In general the results strongly support Fearon's model, though we find that relative national capabilities do tend to affect the outcomes of crises. This study highlights the importance of combining formal models of political events with large-N empirical tests.Traditional notions of interstate bargaining suggest that crisis outcomes are a function of the relative military might of the participants and the willingness of each side to use force in order to demonstrate a higher degree of commitment to the issue at stake than the opponent (Snyder and Diesing, 1977;Maoz, 1983;Leng, 1993). The escalation of crises, according to this view, occurs as each side attempts to show its opponent that the costs of further conflict over the issue at stake will be larger than that opponent wants to bear. The outcomes of crises should be that either one side backs down, because it is less resolved than its opponent, or neither side backs down and the two sides go to war. The words often used to summarize this perspective on bargaining is that international crises are "competitions in risk taking" (Schelling, 1960;Kahn, 1965).In a recent article, James Fearon (1994) offers a fresh perspective on interstate crisis bargaining. Drawing on Thomas Schelling's (1960) work on credible commitment, he argues that the escalation and outcomes of interstate disputes are in large International Studies Quarterly (1999) 43, 389-405 for the comments and help on earlier drafts of this article. The article also benefited from the constructive suggestions of the reviewers and editors of this journal. We wish to thank the National Science Foundation, whose financial assistance through grant SBR-9507909 facilitated this research. We alone are responsible for any errors in this work.

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Crisis outcomes have traditionally been explained by the participating states' relative power and relative ability to demonstrate resolve. Resolve has almost always been defined as the willingness of a state to go to war to obtain a favorable settlement and almost always operationalized in terms of the amount of force that a state uses in a particular crisis or dispute. However, a growing body of literature suggests that domestic political structures are an important source of resolve and therefore should be an important determinant of interstate crisis/dispute outcomes. This hypothesis is tested using two distinct data sets and the results indicate that the hypothesis is not only correct, but that domestic political structures are a stronger predictor of interstate conflict outcomes than either relative capability or the traditional notion of relative resolve.What determines the outcome of an international dispute? Traditionally, a state's success has been thought to be a function of its military capability and its demonstrated resolve. These two attributes of crisis &dquo;structure,&dquo; the balance of capability and the balance of motivation, are at the heart of a number of models of international crises (e.g., Morgan 1994; Morrow 1989; Snyder and Diesing 1977). As Snyder and Diesing (1977: 525) state, &dquo;Comparative interests and comparative military strength, as the parties perceive them, are the basic determinants of relative bargaining power and crisis outcomes.&dquo; This emphasis on capability and resolve in interstate crises is often associated with political realism, which views international relations as state-centric, a constant struggle for power, and governed exclusively by national interests. Yet, a number of recent studies have highlighted the importance of domestic influ-NOTE : I am grateful to Glenn Palmer, Andy Enterline, Pat James, and Stuart Bremer for their helpful comments on this paper. I also thank the editors, Bill Dixon and Lyn Ragsdale, along with two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.

Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering from Binghamton University. He has worked for Lockheed Martin, IBM, General Electric, BAE Systems, and Celestica Corporation. He has 25 years of experience in these companies designing military and commercial power electronic circuits and as a systems engineer for airborne and land vehicle electrical systems. He is a licensed professional engineer. He also received a B.A in philosophy and a M.Ed. from the University of Vermont. Before becoming an engineer he was a high school mathematics teacher.