We propose and characterize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker prefers act f to act g if and only if E μ φ( E π u○f) ⩾ E μ φ( E π u○g), where E is the expectation operator, u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, φis an increasing transformation, and μis a subjective probability over the set Πof probability measures πthat the decision maker thinks are relevant given his subjective information. A key feature of our model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. We show that attitudes toward pure risk are characterized by the shape of u, as usual, while attitudes toward ambiguity are characterized by the shape of φ. Ambiguity itself is defined behaviorally and is shown to be characterized by properties of the subjective set of measures Π. One advantage of this model is that the well-developed machinery for dealing with risk attitudes can be applied as well to ambiguity attitudes. The model is also distinct from many in the literature on ambiguity in that it allows smooth, rather than kinked, indifference curves. This leads to different behavior and improved tractability, while still sharing the main features (e.g., Ellsberg's paradox). The maxmin expected utility model (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) with a given set of measures may be seen as a limiting case of our model with infinite ambiguity aversion. Two illustrative portfolio choice examples are offered. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

for helpful discussion, Andreas Lange for pointing out an error in a previous version and seminar audiences at the Cowles Foundation workshop "Uncertainty in Economic Theory,"the

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg's paradox) with dynamic consistency for all nonnull events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes' rule to subsets of the set of priors, where the specific subset depends on the preferences, the conditioning event, and the choice problem (i.e., a feasible set of acts together with an act chosen from that set). Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

We use panel data on prices and net asset values to test whether dramatic countryspecific news affects the response of closed-end country fund prices to asset value. In a typical week, prices underreact to changes in fundamentals; the (short-run) elasticity of price with respect to asset value is significantly less than one. In weeks with news appearing on the front page of The New York Times, prices react much more; the elasticity of price with respect to asset value is closer to one. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that news events lead some investors to react more quickly. SOME RESEARCHERS BELIEVE that anomalous empirical regularities in financial returns can be explained by investor underreaction or overreaction to news. 1 A serious problem with interpreting these regularities as caused by "overreaction" or "underreaction" is that these explanations are usually ex post justifications of anomalies present in the data. The underlying problem facing financial economists is that neither fundamentals nor other possible determinants of investor behavior, such as "investor sentiment," are observable. As a result, they are usually forced to make assumptions about the properties of fundamentals before applying tests of market efficiency.Although it may be difficult to show that investor over-or underreaction is the reason for various anomalies, it is clear that agents often do not act

We conduct experiments measuring individual behavior under compound risk, simple risk, and ambiguity. We focus on (1) treatment of compound risks relative to simple risks and (2) the relationship between compound risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes. We find that compound risks are valued differently than corresponding reduced simple risks. These differences measure compound risk attitudes. These attitudes display more aversion as the reduced probability of the winning event increases. Like Halevy [Halevy Y (2007) Ellsberg revisited: An experimental study. Econometrica 75:503-536], we find an association between compound risk reduction and ambiguity neutrality. However, in contrast to the almost perfect identification in Halevy's data, we find a substantially weaker relation in both directions. First, a majority of our ambiguity-neutral subjects fail to reduce compound risk. Second, almost a quarter of our subjects who reduce compound risk are nonneutral to ambiguity. All of the latter come from the more quantitatively sophisticated part of our subject pool.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx