In a wormhole attack, colluding nodes create connecting the purported neighbors using a covert the illusion that two remote regions of a MANET are communication mechanism. The wormhole undermines directly connected through nodes that appear to be shortest path routing calculations, allowing the attacking neighbors, but are actually distant from each other. This nodes to attract traffic from other parts of the network so it is undermines shortest-path routing calculations, allowing routed through them. The wormhole thus creates two artificial the attacking nodes to attract traffic, which can then be traffic choke points that are under the control of the attacker manipulated. Prior research has concentrated on out-of-and can be utilized at an opportune future time to degrade or band wormholes, which covertly connect the purported analyze the traffic stream.neighbors via a separate wireline network or RF channel.Prior research on wormholes in MANETs has concentratedWe present a detailed description of in-band wormholes in primarily on out-of-band wormholes, which covertly connect OLSR networks. These connect the purported neighbors purported neighbors via a separate communication via covert, multi-hop tunnels. In-band wormholes are an mechanism, such as a wireline network or additional RF important threat because they do not require specialized channel that is not generally available throughout the network hardware and can be launched by any node in the [HU03] [HONG05]. This paper describes in detail, in-band MANET. Moreover, unlike out-of-band wormholes, in-wormholes, which covertly connect the purported neighbors band wormholes consume network capacity, inherently via multi-hop tunnels through the primary link layer. In-band degrading service. We explain the conditions under which wormholes are important for several reasons. First, because an in-band wormhole will collapse and how it can be made they do not require additional specialized hardware, they can collapse resilient. We identify the self-contained and be launched from any node in the network; as a result, they extended forms of in-band wormholes and present may be more likely to be used by real adversaries. Second, wormhole gravitational analysis, a technique for comparing unlike out-of-band wormholes, which actually add channel the effect of wormholes on the network. Finally, we identify potential countermeasures for preventing and capacit toth network, in-an wormholes tinualy consume network ca acity i.e. waste bandwidth) thereby detecting in-band wormholes based on packet loss rates, .y ..y packet delays, and topological characteristics, and we inhermen asurs service degrandaton. Thrd athough describe the results of initial laboratory experiments to cout-of-band wormhols sem toodepend assess theireffectiveness, on out-of-band mechanisms such as geographic position assess their effectiveness. information or highly synchronized clocks, countermeasures Index Terms-Computer network security, routing, for in-band wormholes may not. mobile communications, re...

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This paper addresses issues relevant to implementing security for IP multicast networks. These issues are of importance to application developers wishing to implement security services for their multicast applications. The paper investigates the steps required to create a secure multicast session including issues of group membership and key distribution. A common simple criteria is established that can be used to evaluate multicast keying architectures. The criteria focuses on the efficiency and scalability of the keying solution. Using this criteria, several keying architectures are evaluated and compared to determine their strengths and weaknesses.

INTRODUCTIONMulticast communication as defined in [1] is an efficient means of distributing data to a group of participants. In contrast to unicast communications, multicast routing permits a single IP datagram to be routed to multiple hosts with minimal redundant transmission within a network. Membership in a multicast group is often highly dynamic, with receivers entering and leaving the multicast session without the permission or explicit knowledge of other hosts. The inherent cost and resource benefits of multicast routing and data delivery are clear; however, the group-oriented communication paradigm presents new and unique technical challenges beyond traditional network security approaches.Potential security threats to multicast communications are similar to those encountered in unicast transmissions. Threats include the unauthorized creation, alteration, destruction, and illegitimate use of data [5]. In the case of multicast traffic, because of the inherent broad scope of a multicast session, the potential for attacks may be greater than for unicast traffic. It is desirable to secure these vulnerabilities while maintaining some of the efficiency and performance benefits of multicast service.The field of multicast networking and related security issues is a broad technical subject. Within the space limitations allowed, we discuss some relevant technical issues and performance tradeoffs to consider when applying security and key management techniques in support of multicast networking. First, we provide a brief background of multicast technology and potential network security threats and issues. Second, we explore the application of existing and proposed security techniques for multicast networking, including key distribution, dynamic key management, and reliability issues. Throughout this paper we hope to summarize performance and security policy considerations within the context and impact of overall architectural performance.