By examining the passage on virtues in the Epinomis, possibly by Philip of Opus, I aim to show that the ethical theory expounded there differs both from the account of the Laws and from the notions we find in the fragmentary evidence concerning the Old Academy. Unlike the account in the Laws the unity of virtue is provided, not by justice, but by piety interpreted as a virtue involving mathematics, especially astronomy. The peculiar importance of mathematics in virtue is not attested in any of the other authors of the Old Academy.

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The paper aims to show that ἄνοια is the general term for the diseases of the soul, and that μανία and ἀμαϑία are not necessarily two distinct species but two levels of the same disease: ignorance signifies the cognitive state, whereas madness indicates both a cognitive state and a specific phenomenal character. Plato's other remarks on psychic ailments can be incorporated into this account. The result can also be accommodated to the general theory of the soul-body relationship in the dialogue. Incarnated souls cannot work without the corresponding activity of the body, even if this does not rule out the possibility for the soul to exist in a discarnate state.

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It has been argued that Proclus' notion of ζαξυατ α in general played a subservient role within an overall soteriological scope of the oeuvre and that this is the cause of the alleged inconsistencies we find in his works. Accordingly, in his attempt to reveal the link between the human soul and intelligible entities, Proclus did not pay much attention to clarifying the problems of ζαξυατ α. For him, this capacity is nothing but a force distracting us from our proper end, which is union with the intelligible world. 1 Sometimes he did use rhetoric about deceptive ζαξυατ α. In his poetical language, he says that the soul gives birth to truth and science when looking at the intellect, but on seeing the world of generation it bears ζαξυατ α and passionate desire (1.269.7-9; see also 1.378.3-5, 3.236.27-9, 3.334.5). Now, while there is no denying that Proclus' main concerns in studying the nature of soul focus on its origin and the way of returning to it, I hope it can be shown that he retained some interest in problems such as the specific function and working of ζαξυατ α. It is beyond question that he tried to embed the whole notion of ζαξυατ α into the general scope of directing our soul back to its origin, but this fact does not rule out the possibility that he devoted considerable energy to envisaging the intricate problems concerning this capacity in the human soul. Another, more special, difficulty concerns the relation of ζαξυατ α and δ ωα. There are serious problems of demarcating their functions. As the lowest capacity of the rational soul, δ ωα sometimes seems to be credited with the activities elsewhere attributed to ζαξυατ α, the highest non-rational capacity of the soul. 2 The problem is particularly acute in the commentary on Timaeus where, it has been argued, ζαξυατ α and δ ωα have similar functions and therefore it is fairly hard to describe the proper domain of both capacities. In what follows, I hope to show that we can draw a line between the two capacities in the commentary. This enables us to give a clearer account of how ζαξυατ α and δ ωα work. His account is by no means as unclear as it might seem. As will be indicated below, ζαξυατ α is closely linked to sense-perception, sometimes so closely that the two capacities appear indistinguishable. Discussion of this issue, however, must refer to notions and functions that are primarily linked to δ ωα in the commentary. For this reason, it may be useful to discuss first δ ωα and examine its relation to sense-perception. If the two capacities do not need intermediaries to contact, then one could suspect that in some cases ζαξυατ α is not an independent capacity at all. The immediate contact of δ ωα and sense-perception is well manifested in the passage at 1.