No abstract

Previous research has indicated a bias in memory-based decision-making, with people preferring options that they remember better. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this memory bias remain elusive. Here, we propose that choosing poorly remembered options is conceptually similar to choosing options with uncertain outcomes. We predicted that the memory bias would be reduced when options had negative subjective value, analogous to the reflection effect, according to which uncertainty aversion is stronger in gains than in losses. In two preregistered experiments ( N = 36 each), participants made memory-based decisions between appetitive and aversive stimuli. People preferred better-remembered options in the gain domain, but this behavioral pattern reversed in the loss domain. This effect was not related to participants’ ambiguity or risk attitudes, as measured in a separate task. Our results increase the understanding of memory-based decision-making and connect this emerging field to well-established research on decisions under uncertainty.

Human decisions often deviate from economic rationality and are influenced by cognitive biases. One such bias is the memory bias according to which people prefer choice options they have a better memory of—even when the options’ utilities are comparatively low. Although this phenomenon is well supported empirically, its cognitive foundation remains elusive. Here we test two conceivable computational accounts of the memory bias against each other. On the one hand, a single-process account explains the memory bias by assuming a single biased evidence-accumulation process in favor of remembered options. On the contrary, a dual-process account posits that some decisions are driven by a purely memory-driven process and others by a utility-maximizing one. We show that both accounts are indistinguishable based on choices alone as they make similar predictions with respect to the memory bias. However, they make qualitatively different predictions about response times. We tested the qualitative and quantitative predictions of both accounts on behavioral data from a memory-based decision-making task. Our results show that a single-process account provides a better account of the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to deepening our understanding of memory-based decision-making, our study provides an example of how to rigorously compare single- versus dual-process models using empirical data and hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation methods.

This Early Release article has been peer-reviewed and accepted, but has not been through the composition and copyediting processes. The final version may differ slightly in style or formatting and will contain links to any extended data. Alerts: Sign up at www.eneuro.org/alerts to receive customized email alerts when the fully formatted version of this article is published. 1. Frontal, parietal and temporal brain areas are differentially activated when disambiguating potential objects of joint attention 2. Neural Substrates of Joint Attention