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The Islamic Republic of Iran has experienced a remarkable demographic transition over the last three decades. As a result of social, demographic and economic changes, Iran’s fertility declined from 7.0 births per woman in 1980 to around 1.8 to 2.0 in 2011 based on our estimation (McDonald et al. 2015). The initial rise and rapid fall of fertility accompanied by a decline of child mortality led to a post-revolutionary youth bulge in the age distribution that will lead to rapid ageing in the longer-term future. Others have argued that Iran’s fertility has fallen to much lower levels - as low as 1.5 births per woman (eg. Erfani 2013). Such low estimates led to the Government of Iran adopting a pronatalist policy with the aim of increasing fertility, although the components of the policy are still under discussion. Different views have been expressed on the role of family planning and other programs in meeting population policy goals in Iran in the future with some advocating the discontinuation of government assistance to family planning. This paper aims to review the trends and levels of fertility, marriage, and family planning and their implications for policy. Using various datasets and detailed parity-based measures of fertility, the dynamics of fertility regulation practiced by Iranian couples are investigated. Our findings suggest that contraceptive use stabilized before 2000 and postponement of the first child and wide birth intervals are the main contributors to the level of fertility. Therefore, instead of discontinuation of the family planning program, policy to sustain fertility at its present level or a little higher needs to focus upon improving the economic circumstances of young people so that they are able to make less constrained choices about family formation than is the case at present.

In a context where 46 countries now consider their fertility rate to be too low, attention is turning to the need for policy actions to increase fertility rates. This article discusses the reasons why action is required and why countries have been slow to take policy action. It then considers a wide range of possible policies and assesses them against a set of eleven social policy principles. The policies examined include tax-transfer policies, subsidised services, childcare and early childhood education, parent leave and working hours policies, employment policies for young people, public education campaigns and broader social arrangements. The conclusion drawn is that the focus of policy should not be pronatalism as such but support for families with children. Support for families with children means good family policy, good gender policy, good employment/human capital policy, good child development policy and, if there is a need to increase or sustain birth rates, it will also mean good birth policy.

With inexorable population ageing, successive Australian governments have sought to implement policies, on both the production and consumption side, that place a greater onus on older citizens to be financially self-sufficient as a means of offsetting costs due to ageing. Over the previous 30 years, a time of considerable labour market growth and policy change, mature age labour force participation increased significantly in Australia. In this paper, we utilise the National Transfer Accounts methodology to examine the impact that the increases in mature age labour force participation have had on the Life Cycle Deficit -the difference between what age groups consume and what they produce through their own labour. We expected and found that the age entering the life cycle deficit is strongly influenced by changing patterns of mature age labour force participation. Both cross-sectional and cohort analyses show that over this 30 year time horizon, the ages at which the life cycle deficit moves from positive to negative territory and vice versa have gradually increased over time. The growth in mature age labour force participation since the turn of this century has led to large increases in mature age labour income, the most important effect of which appears to have been a substantial increase in private saving by mature age Australians. Implications of a recent slowing in mature age labour force participation in Australia are discussed.