The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has published its Svensson decision on hyperlinks and BestWater order on embedding in 2014 -and thus contributed to a fierce debate on the future of popular online activities. On the one hand, the preliminary rulings evidenced considerable flexibility as they allow the use of hyperlinks to and the embedding of publicly available contents. Indeed, under BestWater the embedding of illegally published materials might be also accepted. On the other hand, those decisions have to be read in conjunction with the already existing case law of the CJEU, and to a certain extent the Svensson and BestWater rulings do contradict some of the earlier decisions. Not surprisingly, courts of the Member States are still struggling with the correct treatment of these forms of online activities, and thus they continue to rely on the CJEU's interpretation of EU Directives. This paper aims to briefly introduce the different types of linking. The CJEU case law will then be discussed: starting from the Svensson/BestWater cases, referring to former rulings such as SGAE, TV Catch Up or ACI Adam, and discussing the post-Svensson cases as well as currently pending applications. Finally, the paper aims to provide a balanced approach towards the treatment of linking, where external solutions -that is, other than the CJEU's own -might also be adopted.Mezei: Enter the matrix: the effects of the CJEU's case law on linking and streaming technologies (GRUR Int. 2016, 887) 888Trying to fit a square archaic peg into the hexagonal hole of modernity?Notwithstanding its past spanning several decades, the copyright aspects of linking have always been subject to controversy. On the one hand, linking is an excellent example of end-user conduct in the information society as it gives rise to speedy and effective use of Internet. On the other hand, it enables access to content with a custom path even without the prior consent of the entitled parties. It is therefore essential to strike a balance among the interests of different stakeholders. 1This not only concerns a meaningful distinction between various linking techniques, but also the creation of harmony between copyright and other rights, or as the case may be, fundamental rights. In addition, answers to these questions may not necessarily be taken from the analogue world. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, "strict application of the publication rule in these circumstances would be like trying to fit a square archaic peg into the hexagonal hole of modernity". 2The primary objective of linking is to facilitate access to information on the World Wide Web that has virtually become impossible to untangle by now. The Executive Committee of ALAI noted that "[g]enerally speaking, hypertext links and inline links make it easier for the user to search the Internet, as he or she can click on the link instead of copying and pasting or writing the relevant web address. The fundamental contribution of links to Internet traffic is to speed up the user's access t...

On 15 December 2020, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on a single market for digital services (Digital Services Act, DSA) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC. The legislative project seeks to establish a robust and durable governance structure for the effective supervision of providers of intermediary services. To this end, the DSA sets out numerous due diligence obligations of intermediaries concerning any type of illegal information, including copyright-infringing content. Empirically, copyright law accounts for most content removal from online platforms, by an order of magnitude. Thus, copyright enforcement online is a major issue in the context of the DSA, and the DSA will be of utmost importance for the future of online copyright in the EU. Against this background, the European Copyright Society takes this opportunity to share its view on the relationship between the copyright acquis and the DSA, as well as further selected aspects of the DSA from a copyright perspective.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a part of our daily life, and “algorithmic creativity” has similarly gained a spotlight recently. From paintings to music, machines generate outputs that seem to comply with various prerequisites of copyright protection. The idea (and to some degree the need) to honour such achievements by legal protection has also emerged. This article demonstrates that contrary to the view of the proponents of an AI-copyright regime, time has not ripened for AI-copyright. The core elements of copyright law - namely the concept of authorship, originality and moral rights, as well as copyright’s history and incentives - are deeply rooted in an anthropocentric (although not only author-centric) world. Unless paradigm shift in copyright law, the lack of direct human element of an AI-generated output shall lead to the unavailability of copyright protection for these outputs. The article similarly highlights why the proposed alternative forms of copyright related rights or sui generis protection are doctrinally unfounded or practically unfit to provide for a sound solution that does not destroy the existing copyright regime and diminish the value of human creations.

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