Being aware of the potentially devastating impacts of plant diseases on food security, governments have designed and employ plant health legislation to prevent or inhibit the worst impacts. The development of such policies in Britain, and latterly in Europe, can be closely linked to disease events that have occurred in the potato sector. We analyse early and current examples of policies governing potato diseases in Britain to identify the decision processes leading to the implementation of such phytosanitary policies and how they have evolved over time and in response to different disease threats. Reasons for developing and implementing phytosanitary policies include the desire to prevent pathogens being introduced (entering and establishing in a new area), the protection of export markets, and the lack of effective control measures. Circumstances in which regulatory policies would not be appropriate could include situations where a disease is already widely distributed, unacceptable costs, lack of exclusion measures, or difficulties of disease diagnosis. We conclude that in general, government policies have worked well in protecting British potato growing over the last one hundred years, despite of the failures of some of the policies discussed here. They have also contributed much to the development of plant health policies for other crops. Voluntary grower initiatives are a new mechanism complementing existing formal policies with an additional level of security that allows individual growers to take on additional responsibility rather than relying entirely on government legislation.

Even before the success of William Perkin's mauve at the end of the 1850s, there were attempts to synthesize artificial dyes that were identical with those found in nature. Alizarin, the dye derived from the madder root, was the first to be investigated, and it was Perkin who was to file for a patent in June 1869 just one day before the German chemists Heinrich Caro, Carl Graebe and Carl Liebermann. Rivalry between the parties soon turned to negotiations and collaboration. Perkin's company retained the British trade, while the Germans, in the form of the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik (BASF) controlled the continental European and United States markets. This and similar agreements extinguished the madder trade, and subsequently artificial alizarin passed almost completely to the Germans. They achieved a monopoly by dictating the level and prices of supplies, which did much to diminish the strength of the dye-making industry in Britain. The formation in 1882–83 of the British Alizarine Company did little to redress the overall balance. This taught British dye firms a tough lesson. The same, they hoped, would not be allowed to happen again, even when the attention of the German research chemists turned to indigo.

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The creation of the Central Laboratory immediately after the United Alkali Company (UAC) was formed in 1890, by amalgamating the Leblanc alkali works in Britain, brought high expectations of repositioning the company by replacing its obsolete Leblanc process plant and expanding its range of chemical products. By 1914, UAC had struggled with few exceptions to adopt new technologies and processes and was still reliant on the Leblanc process. From 1914, the Government would rely heavily on its contribution to the war effort. As a major heavy-chemical manufacturer, UAC produced chemicals for explosives and warfare gases, while also trying to maintain production of many essential chemicals including fertilisers for homeland consumption. UAC's wartime effort was led by the Central Laboratory, working closely with the recently established Engineer's Department to develop new process pathways, build new plant, adapt existing plant, and produce the contracted quantities, all as quickly as possible to meet the changing battlefield demands. This article explores how wartime conditions and demands provided the stimulus for the Central Laboratory's crucial R&D work during World War One.