Abstrakt: V úvodní části zrekapitulujeme v hrubých obrysech Popperovu teorii demarkace v návaznosti na jeho další teze týkající se kritiky induktivních postupů, úlohy metafyziky ve vědě a falzifikaci. Dílo vídeňského filozofa vyvolalo značné množství reakcí, jejichž spektrum sahalo od dílčích modifikací Popperových myšlenek jeho žáky, přes návrhy nových teorií jím inspirovaných, až po zásadní kritiku. Hlavní směry této kritiky načrtneme (bez nároku na úplnost) v další části statě. Polemizujeme především s jednostranným odmítnutím indukce a pokoušíme se zde rehabilitovat některé induktivní postupy. Následně upozorníme na nedostatky Popperova pojetí falzifikace i na problémy použitelnosti jeho demarkačního kritéria na typických příkladech ze sféry metafyziky a "pseudovědy" (psychoanalýza, astrologie). Závěr věnujeme diskuzi o úloze indukce a dedukce ve vědě, posouzení užitečnosti Popperových teorií ve vztahu k současné vědě.Klíčová slova: demarkační problém, Karl Popper, falzifikovatelnost, induktivní metody, pseudověda. Abstract:The opening section briefly examines Popper's theory of demarcation and his views on inductive methods, the role of metaphysics in science, and falsification. Upon publication the work of this Viennese philosopher met a wide range of reactions, from partial modifications to proposals of new theories inspired by his work to complete dismissal. The main lines of critical argument against Popper's doctrine will be outlined here: I will argue that his complete rejection of inductive methodology is unjustified and will call for its partial acceptance in science. I will also challenge the shortcomings of Popper's idea of falsifiability and his demarcation criterion, the limited suitability of which will be demonstrated with typical examples of "pseudoscience" such as psychoanalysis and astrology. The last section proposes a moderate approach in the induction-deduction debate. In closing I will assess the practical value of Popper's theories in today's science.Keywords: Demarcation problem, Karl Popper, falsifiability, inductive methods, pseudoscience. SGS-2015-024 Problematické aspekty kritického racionalismu: návrhy řešení. Studie vznikla za podpory grantového systému Západočeské univerzity v Plzni v rámci projektu

V následujícím textu nejprve zařadíme Kantovo dílo do kontextu osvícenské filosofie a přiblížíme jeho náhled na některé otázky tehdejší metafyziky a přírodní filosofie. Poté se zaměříme zejména na Kantovu svéráznou koncepci prostoru a času v rámci transcendentální estetiky a transcendentální logiky, kterou Kant systematicky představil v Kritice čistého rozumu. Následně přezkoumáme hlavní námitky, které filosofové i vědci vůči této koncepci vznesli. To nám pak bude odrazovým můstkem k závěrečné debatě o vztahu fyzikálních pojmů a teorií k metafyzice.

Objectivity, as one of the key attributes of science, has become an indispensable part of its ethos and a central theme of the philosophy of science. As such, it has been a subject of philosophical reflection by a number of authors. In our project – in which both philosophers of science and scientists participate – we examine the concept of objectivity in the natural sciences with the tools of experimental philosophy. We aim to identify specific operational dimensions of objectivity, those with which current scientist actually work, thus making them accessible for further theoretical analysis and research. In this text, we present results from the first, qualitative phase of our research based on in-depth interviews and focus groups with scientists working in the Czech Republic. Further, we confront this empirical data with theoretical notions of objectivity (Hacking, Crombie, Solomon, Popper, Galison, Daston, Quine, Kuhn and others). We also present other findings from the research and formulate hypotheses for the research’s subsequent phases.

In this paper, I combine an exposition of the historical development of sociology and philosophy of science from the era of grand theories onwards, with an explication as to why the grand theories have failed. First, I trace some parallels in the history of each of the disciplines. After presenting their chronological development, I scrutinize the metatheoretical findings about the disciplines and examine the main ontological and epistemic reasons why attempts at these general theories or frameworks have not succeeded. Among them are the lack of a universal methodology and of a theoretical core, together with the impossibility of achieving a common objective view. On this basis I conclude that general theories or frameworks are not achievable in principle. As it turns out, however, some contemporary social theorists and philosophers still harbor hopes that they can be successfully formulated, or at the least do not rule out such possibility. Thus, in closing, I argue that the critical points can also be applied to these latest attempts, as the call for grand theories or frameworks has never ceased and returns regularly with each new generation of social theorists and philosophers of science.

Since the early 20th century underdetermination has been one of the most contentious problems in the philosophy of science. In this article I relate the underdetermination problem to models in biology and defend two main lines of argument: First, the use of models in this discipline lends strong support to the underdetermination thesis. Second, models and theories in biology are not determined strictly by the logic of representation of the studied phenomena, but also by other constraints such as research traditions, backgrounds of the scientists, aims of the research and available technology. Convincing evidence for the existence of underdetermination in biology, where models abound, comes both from the fact that for a natural phenomenon we can create a number of candidate models but also from the fact that we do not have a universal rule that would adjudicate among them. This all makes a strong case for the general validity of underdetermination thesis.