The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is a classic example of system of systems (SoS) management. We pay special attention to interdependencies among systems within SoS. The article deals with the requirements for the cyber gateway at the train transportation management system. More and more telemetry and remote control through communication systems are used on the track because of the technological development. The train at cyberspace acts as an end network that is connected to the operating center network via an open public network. The gateway must then meet the requirements of the railway infrastructure as well as the cyber infrastructure. We deal with the integration of various requirements for the train gateway into one verification and certification cycle in this paper. The requirement integration is important because, in the first it is necessary to ensure coherence and consistency between different requirements. The second reason is to speed up possible re-certification. A recertification is necessary because gateway adaptation or installation in a new environment. The European project certMILS deals with the issue of re-certification.

Security concerns become increasingly important in safety-critical industrial cyberphysical systems. Different options for security certification exist. We describe a Common Criteria certification for a MILS separation kernel, and IEC 62443 analysis and certifications for the smart grid, railway and subway pilots using the MILS approach in the research project certMILS.I.

The Urban guided transport management system (UGTMS) as subway, transports from several hundreds of thousands to millions of passengers per day. Size and irreplaceability of subway transport capacity include the subway transport to the critical infrastructures of cities, regions or countries. Modern transport critical infrastructures contain in addition to physical and social parts also the cyber control systems and they are marked as cyber-physical systems (CPS). The CPSs are characterized by safety-critical nature, complexity, connectivity, and open technology. The CPS complexity, openness and dynamics form a large attack surface that may lead to failures and irreparable damage. Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) can meet the high system security requirements. The MILS is a high-assurance security architecture based on the concepts of separation and controlled information flow. The article discusses the possibilities of using the MILS platform in the data communication subsystem, which connects the individual UGTMS subsystems (Wayside subsystem, On-board subsystem and operation control subsystem). Therefore, the communication system should guarantee transmission parameters and do not affect security level of the respective subsystems.

A model-based radiostereometric analysis (MBRSA) is a method for precise measurement of prosthesis migration, which does not require marking the implant with tantalum beads. Instead, the prosthesis pose is typically recovered using a feature-based 2D-3D registration of its virtual model into a stereo pair of radiographs. In this study, we evaluate a novel intensity-based formulation of previously published nonoverlapping area (NOA) approach. The registration is capable of performing with both binary radiographic segmentations and nonsegmented X-ray images. In contrast with the feature-based version, it is capable of dealing with unreliable parts of prosthesis. As the straightforward formulation allows efficient acceleration using modern graphics adapters, it is possible to involve precise high-poly virtual models. Moreover, in case of binary segmentations, the nonoverlapping area is simply interpretable and useful for indicating the accuracy of the registration outcome. In silico and phantom evaluations were performed using a cementless Zweymüller femoral stem and its reverse engineered (RE) model. For initial pose estimates with difference from the ground-truth limited to ±4 mm and ±4°, respectively, the mean absolute translational error was not higher than 0.042 ± 0.035 mm. The error in rotation around the proximodistal axis was 0.181 ± 0.265°, and the error for the remaining axes was not higher than 0.035 ± 0.037°.

The railway transport infrastructure ensures the transfer of large numbers of people and cargo every day. The importance of the railway in terms of ensuring the serviceability of the territory makes it a critical infrastructure. We can observe the development of the use of IT technologies on railway, as in all areas of the human system. The management of the railway as a physical system needs to be superseded by management of the railway as a cyberphysical system. The railway infra-structure has a large area of attack in both, physical space and cyber space. Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) can meet the high system security requirements. The MILS is a high-assurance security architecture based on the concepts of separation and controlled information flow. The article discusses the possibilities of using the MILS platform in the data communication system and the control system of the railway. Keywords: Cyber Physical Systems, Critical Infrastructures, Multiple Independent Levels of Security