Policies that reduce these "child penalties" for women are likely to reduce the gender gap. Such policies could, for example, include making parental leave less generous (thereby lowering employers' expectations of career disruptions) or equalising (expected) parental leave between men and women by dividing these rights more equally between the parents. The above items do not necessarily represent policy recommendations as income distribution goals must be weighed against other objectives relating to, for example, incentives for innovation, entrepreneurship and (human and real) capital investment, employment and fiscal sustainability. But the options should be considered if one wants to put more emphasis on equity goals than has been the case recently.
This article contributes to the relational IR literature on identity politics and Sino‐Japanese relations. Theoretically, we develop Rumelili's framework for studying modes of differentiation by incorporating the sectoral characteristics of key discourse signs. Empirically, we apply this framework to the construction of Self and Other in the official Japanese security discourse regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute from 2010–2014, a period of dispute climax that is meaningful for studying the (re)production of Japan's understanding of China. The inclusiveness of the discourse signs that Japan uses to construct China possibly opens up for a positive evolution of Sino‐Japanese relations, as there is space for progress if China's behavior—and Japan's interpretation of it—proves to be more peaceful, transparent, and law‐abiding. The findings also suggest, however, that the strong sense of superiority in Japan (and China) vis‐à‐vis a subordinate Other may not bode well for Sino‐Japanese relations.
Former Prime Minister Koizumi's surprising victory within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2001 and his subsequent popularity as prime minister led to increased interest in the study of populism in Japan. In addition toŌtake Hideo's prominent contributions, several others have also employed populism as a prism to study Japanese politics. Compared to the major debates on populism and particularly on the populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe over the last two decades, however, the study of Japanese populism seems to be at a less mature stage. Lessons may be learned from the European literature for the community studying Japanese populism. This paper first summarizes the studies on Japanese populism. Then, the main discussions and arguments presented in the academic literature on the PRR in Europe are discussed. Next, this study evaluates how arguments found in studies of European populism can be exploited in further research on populist politicians and parties in Japan. The author recommends further studies on conceptual definitions, on the classifications of politicians and parties, and on explaining the emergence and persistence of these parties and politicians. The findings in this paper encourage and support further research on populism in the Japanese political system. * I am grateful to Scandinavia-Japan Sasakawa Foundation and Itō Foundation for financial support. I would also like to thank Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, Dick Stegewerns, Tor E. Simonsen and two anonymous reviewers for comments and feedback on previous drafts. 574 classification of populist parties and politicians 575
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