As a developing country, Vietnam has a huge social demand for infrastructure. Ho Chi Minh City, where plenty of construction projects are made to cater to social needs, is seen as an economic center of preeminent importance. The development of construction projects in terms of quantity entails, among other things, the burden of construction wastes. In fact, the collection, classification, and treatment of wastes are not paid due attention by construction contractors. Furthermore, there remains a scarcity of enterprises investing in construction waste treatment plants and poor management of wastes. A major part of the waste is poorly treated, causing negative environmental effects. Hence, this paper identified factors affecting the management of construction wastes in Vietnam. A survey was used to collect the data for the analysis. The results illustrate that the critical factors affecting the management of construction wastes in Vietnam are: (1) Ecological design; (2) Optimization of design for reduction of material consumption and construction waste; (3) Recycling and reuse of construction wastes; (4) Workers' awareness of construction wastes; and (5) On-site waste sorting.

Purpose: Our analysis provides empirical evidence on the dynamic relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance in the context of Vietnam. Approach/Methodology/Design: Our findings are drawn from the comprehensive data set of stocks listed on both the Hochiminh Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock Exchange in the food industry from 2007 to 2018. Findings: The results indicate that both managerial shareholdings and ownership concentration negatively drive corporate performance. We further find that corporate performance is also a positive function of both managerial shareholdings and ownership concentration. Practical Implications: The results support the entrenchment hypothesis that the divergence of ownership and control helps managers accumulate substantial private benefits without actually bearing the costs. Block-holders also accumulate private benefits of control through pyramid business structures and cross-holdings across different firms. Therefore, both block-holders and managers are motivated to indulge in non-value maximizing behavior, deteriorating corporate performance. Originality: The entrenchment hypothesis does only exist at a low level of ownership. At the high level of ownership, the entrenchment hypothesis is positioned by the incentive hypothesis. Accordingly, their self-interest behaviors are more likely to be detected and legally riskier. They are motivated to indulge in value-maximizing behaviors and synchronize the interests of shareholders and managers.