Changing patterns of political participation observed by political scientists over the past half-century undermine traditional democratic theory and practice. The vast majority of democratic theory, and deliberative democratic theory in particular, either implicitly or explicitly assumes the need for widespread citizen participation. It requires that all citizens possess the opportunity to participate and also that they take up this opportunity. But empirical evidence gathered over the past half-century strongly suggests that many citizens do not have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the ways that many democratic theorists require, and do not participate in anything like the numbers that they believe is necessary. This paper outlines some of the profound changes that have been experienced by liberal democratic states in the 20th and early 21st Centuries, changes which are still ongoing, and which have resulted in declines in citizens participation and trust, the marginalisation of citizens from democratic life, and the entrenchment of social and economic inequalities which have damaged democracy. The paper challenges the conventional wisdom in rejecting the idea that the future of democracy lies in encouraging more widespread participation. The paper takes seriously the failure of the strategies adopted by many states to increase participation, especially among the poor, and suggests that instead of requiring more of citizens, we should in fact be requiring less of them. Instead of seeking to encourage more citizen participation, we should acknowledge that citizens will probably not participate in the volume, or in the ways, many democratic theorists would like, and that therefore we need an alternative approach: a regime which can continue to produce democratic outcomes, and which satisfies the requirements of political equality, in the absence of widespread participation by citizens.

The continued decline in levels of political engagement among British citizens has led many politicians, commentators and academics from across the political spectrum to advocate a move toward a more direct form of democracy via some kind of localism. The claim is that citizens feel increasingly estranged from the democratic process, and from those organisations on which they have historically relied to represent them within the political system. Consequently, localists argue, there now exists a gap between the people, the institutions which are supposed to work on their behalf, and the decisions made in their name, so the system needs to be reformed in such a way as to give individuals and local communities more of a direct input into the decision‐making process. Calls for a more direct form of democracy via localism are popular among members of the progressive left and the ‘new Conservative’ right, and have become so dominant in political discourse that it is often suggested that ‘we are all localists now’. This article raises questions about the localist agenda, and suggests that the adoption of a more direct form of democracy in Britain may not only fail to address the decline in political engagement, but may also result in the exclusion, marginalisation, and oppression of minority groups.

Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible? Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic States *Liberal democratic states throughout the world are experiencing declining rates of political participation. Many political scientists and political philosophers have attributed this decline to an erosion of social capital: those bonds of reciprocity and trust which used to exist among citizens but which now, as a result of profound social, political, and cultural change, do not (e.g. Macedo et al, 2005; Putnam, 2001; Halpern, 2005; Whiteley, 2012).Does deliberative democracy represent a feasible strategy for the reform of liberal democratic states experiencing declines in political participation? Looking at work on democracy among Anglo-American political philosophers over the past twenty years, it seems that the answer is 'yes' (e.g. Bohman, 2000;Cohen & Sabel, 1997;Dryzek, 2000;Fung, 2004; Goodin, 2008; Gutmann & Thompson, 1998& 2004 Mansbridge, 1999a; Mansbridge et al, 2012; Young, 2000). Deliberative democracy is held by many of its defenders as both a philosophically persuasive model of democracy which improves upon the traditional aggregative representative model and a feasible program for the reform of existing liberal democratic states (e.g. Bohman, 1998; Fishkin, 2011). Deliberative democrats argue that reconfiguring democracy as a process of 'public reasoning' among free and equal citizens can re-connect citizens with one another, and with the institutions which govern them, by resolving the wider challenge of diversity, and increasing the opportunities available to citizens to influence political decisions (Dryzek, 2012; Parkinson, 2012). Moral and political diversity can lead to fragmentation, conflict, and exclusion, so contemporary democracies need to ensure that the rules governing the process of policy formation and decision making are open, transparent, and encourage inclusion among all those who have a stake in the outcome (e.g. Bohman, 2000; Cohen, 2009;Fung & Wright, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 1998). Ensuring inclusion is crucial for democratic theory and practice. It is crucial for democratic theory because a regime which silences the voices of a proportion of its constituent members fails to ensure political equality. It is crucial for democratic practice because the systematic exclusion of citizen voices from democratic processes reinforces the separation of the people from the business of governance (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999b). The more that citizens feel peripheral to the democratic system, the less they see its activities as relevant to them and the less they understand it (Fishkin, 1991;Fung, 2004;Fung & Wright, 2003). Deliberative democrats argue that in emphasizing the need for collective deliberation among citizens on matters of policy and principle, their approach can ensure social unity and political stability in circumstances of diversity, produce democratically legitimate outcomes in the face of disagreement, and offer a response to democratic decline by r...

Debates about multiculturalism, minority rights, and identity dominated Anglo‐American political theory during the majority of the 1990s, and continue to raise important questions concerning the nature of citizenship, community, and the responsibilities of liberal states. They were popular, too, among policy makers, politicians, and journalists: many academics and practitioners were, for a time, united in their support for multiculturalism. Just as the philosophical literature at that time became more ‘multiculturalist’, so many European states increasingly adopted multiculturalist policies as a way of including historically marginalised groups into mainstream liberal culture or, in some cases, as a way of protecting minority groups from unfair pressures from the majority culture. However, as time has gone on, the multiculturalist turn in liberal political theory, and among many European governments, has waned. In the wake of terrorist atrocities around the world, growing concerns about the erosion of civic and national identity, and fears that cultural recognition can permit illiberal practices, many academics and practitioners have sought to distance themselves from the idea that it is a role of the state to afford special treatment to cultural minorities, and have sought once again to emphasise those common bonds which unite citizens of liberal democratic states, rather than those cultural identities which may serve to divide them. This article evaluates some of the recent philosophical literature on multiculturalism against the changing political landscape in Britain and Europe and suggests that the multiculturalist position remains weakened by a number of crucial ambiguities.

David Miller's Strangers in our Midst is an important contribution to the debate among political philosophers about how liberal democratic states should deal with the issue of migration. But it is also a thoughtful statement concerning how best to do political philosophy and, as such, contributes also to the growing debate within Anglo-American political theory about the relative merits of 'ideal' versus 'non-ideal' normative theorising. Miller's argument in the book builds on his earlier published work in suggesting that political philosophy should be 'for Earthlings': it should not be understood as a process of ideal theorising which ignores political reality. He argues that normative theorists should seek to resolve complex political problems by taking seriously the political context that makes these problems complex, rather than putting aside that context in the interests of deriving first principles. This is a controversial approach, which requires political philosophers to take more seriously than they often do the expressed concerns of citizens living in democratic states and the practical problems associated with applying normative principles in ways which actually help address the issue at hand. This piece discusses some of these themes, and the issue of migration more generally, in order to help frame the debate which follows.