The purpose of this study is to examine whether accounting regulation is associated with financial reporting quality in Nigeria. Using accrual-based earnings management construct – abnormal accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality, the study found some significant variation in abnormal accruals with the implementation of International financial reporting standards (IFRS) to regulate accounting practice. Similarly, the research found that the control variables - firm size, leverage, and return on asset have significant effects on financial reporting quality. This study is found to be consistent with previous studies indicating the effectiveness of IFRS adoption in improving financial reporting quality. The study also contributes to the discussion on IFRS adoption across reporting environments. Regulatory agencies in Nigeria might need to consider the combined effect of other corporate governance laws to ensure quality reporting. The study is limited by our sample (2009 - 2014), and by the proxies for both accounting regulation and financial reporting quality, the data of which was in most part handpicked. Future research might consider testing the combined effect of other corporate governance variables like audit committees and board characteristics.

In this study, we examine the effect of directors’ ownership on earnings management practices. Explicitly, we draw from the agency theory to distinguish between ownership by non-executive directors and ownership by executive directors to investigate reasons for directors and managerial opportunistic behaviour. Utilising data from a sample of 864-firm-year observations ranging from 2009 to 2017 period, we test our hypothesis through OLS regression. We find that non-executive directors’ interests in shareholding are significantly associated with higher levels of earnings management. We observed a decrease in abnormal accruals on the overall basis of the combined ownership of both executive and non-executive directors. Overall, ownership by all directors combined significantly reduces managerial opportunism. By contrast, there is no evidence that executive directors’ ownership mitigates managerial opportunism. This paper contributes to corporate governance literature, particularly when the independence of board members is essential. This study disaggregates board ownership into executive holdings and non-executive holdings, dimensions which were hitherto rendered as managerial ownership or board ownership. These findings imply firms’ corporate governance policy and regulations.

Objective: The purpose is to establish the relationship between the analysts' stock valuation, the reporting environment and the stock recommendations. And to investigate the process of incorporating both quantitative and qualitative information into their forecasts. Methodology: The research will be archival, obtaining historical information from DataStream, Stock Exchanges and MSCI. A survey will also be carried out to corroborate findings, as the analysts' valuation process may not be obtained through desk research. Results: The results are expected to show evidence for the incentive conflicts of the analysts' decisions with regards to the peculiarities of the macroeconomic environments under consideration. Implication: The write up has implications for sell-side analysts where they have perceived incentive conflicts when they make recommendations. The research contributes to the argument on the conflicts of interest analysts face in forecasting earnings and making recommendations within the markets peculiar environment.