The aim of this chapter is to explore how ancient medical ideas offer relevant parallels to the modern notions of degree vagueness and combinatorial vagueness with respect to mental health and its management. By closely examining several key examples, this chapter argues that Graeco-Roman physicians recognized physical and mental health as states that admit of gradation and were aware of the nuances, variations, and even the relativity of the distinction between ‘healthy’ and ‘ill’. When it comes to notions of physical and mental health, these nuances are both quantitative and qualitative. One of the characteristics of Graeco-Roman medicine is the consideration given to a body–mind continuum as something that is subject to health and disease and can be the object of medical attention. Section 2 introduces ancient conceptions of physical health and demonstrates the relevance of degree and combinatorial vagueness in this domain. Section 3 focuses on mental health.

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In De alimentorum facultatibus, Book I, Ch. 1, Galen begins his discussion of the powers of foodstuffs by a rough sketch of the opinions of earlier physicians on this subject. He says that according to some of them these powers are only known (γνσθαι) on the basis of experience (πεῖρα), according to others on the basis of a combination of experience and reasoning (λογισμς), whereas a third group gave priority of importance to reasoning (202.4–6 Helmreich). Galen proceeds to say that there is considerable disagreement between these physicians on the topic in question and that, consequently, an unbiased testing of their opinions is necessary; this testing should operate by means of argumentation (πδειξις). Now there are two different starting-points for argumentation, i.e. perception and ‘distinct thinking’ (ἢ γρ ξ αἰσθσεως ἢ κ νοσεως ναργος). Then the text printed by Helmreich runs as follows: κα μς ναγκαῖν στιν ἢ θατρῳ τοτων ἢ μφοτροις χρσασθαι πρς τν το προκειμνου σκμματος εὕρεσιν: ‘It is necessary for us, too, to use either one of these (i.e. either perception or thinking) or both of them in order to find the question under discussion.’

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The philosophical aspects of Greek medicine are now more widely appreciated, not only by historians of science and medicine but also by students of philosophy in a more narrow sense. There has also been a greater appreciation of the fact that Greek medical writers not only reflect a derivative awareness of developments in philosophy but that they also actively contributed to the formation of philosophical thought more strictly defined, for instance by developing concepts and methodologies for the acquisition of knowledge and understanding. Yet the consequences of this for a renewed study of the formation of Greek philosophy have yet to be drawn; and disciplinary boundaries between historians of medicine on the one hand and philosophers and historians of philosophy on the other still pose obstacles to an integrated account of Greek thought that takes on board the contributions by the medical writers. Some preliminary remarks may therefore be in order.