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An essential element in an effective nuclear materials control and accountability (MC&A) program is the measurement of the nuclear material as it is received, moved, processed and shipped. Quality measurement systems and methodologies determine the accuracy of the accountability values. Implementation of a measurement control program is essential to ensure that the measurement systems and methodologies perform as expected. A measurement control program also allows for a determination of the level of confidence in the accounting values. This report is a compilation of workshop materials consisting of lectures on various aspects of measurement control, including calibration, basic statistics and measurement models, analysis of measurement method qualification data, control charts, inventory difference analysis, and measurement control for specific measurement systems. The objectives of these materials are to identify, study, and discuss best practices in measurement and measurement control for the accountability of nuclear material. Presentation is envisioned to be through classroom instruction and discussion related to physical and error measurement models, uncertainty estimation, measurement control, and other areas of interest related to measurements. Several practical and hands-on exercises are included for demonstration of the various measurement concepts contained in the lecture/discussion sessions. Mode of Instruction The suggested mode of instruction for these materials is lecture, demonstrations, and participant-led practical exercises. Participants Participants attending this workshop should currently, or in the near future, be responsible for measurements and/or measurement control or material accountability at their facilities. It is suggested that the ideal participant pool consist of several MC&A "teams" that include MC&A specialists, measurement experts, and statisticians.

If Insider selects the item inventory as their target, a defect will be introduced into the inventory Ability and probability to detect a given defect depends upon several things: 1) How the item is inspected (e.g., inspection procedure) a) Item Count b) Inventory by serial number and location c) Confirmatory measurement d) Verification measurement 2) Number of defects (e.g., 1 item or several items) 3) Number of items inspected during each inventory 4) Frequency of inspections (timeliness of detection)

The determination, either through direct observation or an electronic system, of the cause of an alarm and the extent of the threat. CENTRAL ALARM STATION:An installation which provides for the complete and continuous alarm monitoring, assessment and communications with guards, facility management and the response force. CRITICAL SYSTEM ELEMENT:A component or subcomponent of a protection system that directly effects the ability of the system to perform a required function. A critical system component may be equipment, personnel, or procedures. DEFENCE IN DEPTH:A concept used to design physical protection systems that requires an adversary to overcome or circumvent multiple obstacles, either similar or diverse, in order to achieve his objective. DESIGN BASIS THREAT:The attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage, against which a physical protection system is designed and evaluated.