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In this paper, we test whether sanctions applied to an entire group on account of the free-riding of one of its members can promote group cooperation. To measure the efficiency of such collective sanctions, we conducted a lab experiment based on a standard public good game. The results show that, overall, collective sanctions are ineffective. Moreover, when subjects are able to punish their peers, the level of cooperation is lower in the regime of collective sanctions than under individual sanctions. Both outcomes can be explained by a general disapproval of the collective responsibility for an individual fault: in the post-experimental survey, an absolute majority evaluated such regimes as unfair. While collective sanctions are not an effective means for boosting group compliance, there are nevertheless two insights to be gained here. First, there are differences across genders: under collective sanctions, men’s level of compliance is significantly higher than under individual sanctions, while the opposite is true for women. Second, there were intriguing differences in outcomes between the different regime types. Under collective sanctions, a person who is caught tends to comply in the future, at least in the short term. By contrast, under individual sanctions, an individual wrongdoer decreases his or her level of compliance in the next period.

With the advent of online subject pools, conducting experiments outside the laboratory has become more popular among the scientific community. Unlike the lab, online and field environments tend to be accompanied by a loss of control. In this article we introduce otree_tools, a concise yet powerful add-on for oTree (Chen et al., 2016). otree_tools provides novel ways by which to measure behaviors that are potentially important in the social sciences, such as attention, multitasking and effort. The software also features a novel method of tracking time through the identification of noise.We demonstrate the utility of otree_tools with the help of experimental evidence. The software substantially increases control of the environment. Moreover, the original metrics can be employed for innovative outcome variables, opening the avenue for new research opportunities.

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