Zudem ist der Erfolg von ‚COIN' stets an die äußerst fragliche Machbarkeit von "statebuilding" und Sozialtechnologie gebunden. Hinzu kommt eine ma nichäische Sichtweise der Vertreter von ‚COIN' auf die vermeintlich stets un terdrückerischen Aufständischen als getrennt von "der" Bevölkerung. Hunt, David: Dirty Wars.

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This article raises the question of how NATO became bogged down in Afghanistan. I scrutinise how the alliance became involved in Afghanistan and how it formulated its strategy. In doing this, I follow the general premises of practice theory. However, instead of the common focus on diplomats and their everyday doings, this article suggests an approach that pays more attention to the structure of the field of positions. I demonstrate that the actions of permanently seconded representatives of member states and of NATO’s administrative cadre were crucial in drawing the alliance into Afghanistan. I argue that their actions significantly contributed to the creation of a fatal common sense: namely that the alliance had to become and remain engaged even in the absence of clear political goals. This provided the basis for a means-focused and endless mission.