Many developing countries are unable to provide their industrial sectors with reliable electric power, with the result that many enterprises must contend with an insufficient and unreliable supply of electricity. Because of these constraints, enterprises often opt for self-generation of electricity even though it is widely considered a second-best solution. This paper develops a theoretical model of investment behavior in remedial infrastructure in the presence of physical constraints. It then illustrates the model's predictions using a large crosscountry sample of enterprises from the World Bank Enterprise Survey database. Electricity-intensive sectors in high-outage countries are characterized by a significantly lower share of small firms. JEL codes: H54, L94, L16 And God said, 'Let there be light' and there was light, but the Electricity Board said He would have to wait until Thursday to be connected.

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In the absence of a public safety net, wealthy Africans have the social obligation to share their resources with their needy relatives in the form of cash transfers and inefficient family hiring. We develop a model of entrepreneurial choice that accounts for this social redistributive constraint. We derive predictions regarding employment choices, productivity, and profitability of firms run by entrepreneurs of African versus non‐African origin. Everything else equal, local firms are overstaffed and less productive than firms owned by non‐locals, which discourages local entrepreneurship. Using data from the manufacturing sector, we illustrate the theory by structurally estimating the proportion of missing African entrepreneurs. Our estimates, which are suggestive due to the data limitation, vary between 8% and 12.6% of the formal sector workforce. Implications for the role of social protection are discussed.

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