This introduction contextualizes and evaluates Herbert Marcuse's the accompanying, previously untranslated review of John Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Marcuse's critique of pragmatism is indebted to Max Horkheimer's claim that pragmatism is an example of "traditional" theory and reduces thought to mere instrument in service of external ends. Unlike Horkheimer, Marcuse concedes that Dewey, unlike the logical positivists, attempted to develop a material logic of ends. However, he concludes that the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. I place this conclusion in the context of Marcuse's critique of technological reason. Lastly, I defend Dewey from the charge of crude instrumentalism and delineate Marcuse's and Dewey's critical disagreement on science's capacity for self-refl ection.

Despite accepting Robert Talisse's pluralist critique of models of democratic legitimacy that rely on substantive images of the common good, there is insufficient reason to dismiss Dewey's thought from future attempts at a pragmatist philosophy of democracy. First, Dewey's use of substantive arguments does not prevent him from also making epistemic arguments that proceed from the general conditions of inquiry. Second, Dewey's account of the mean-ends transaction shows that ends-in-view are developed from within the process of democratic inquiry, not imposed from without. Third, Talisse's model does not satisfy another general norm of inquirythat of charity.A sure sign that a philosophical movement has reached maturity is that it takes a moment to stop fighting enemies from without and sets its sights on enemies from within. When absolutists, realists, idealists and postmodernists are at the gate, we pragmatists have to stand united. Once secure, we begin to take roll to find who fits within the movement and who does not.This appears to have happened in one area of contemporary pragmatic thought. Until recently, if thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, and Richard Posner are to be believed, it was an open question whether pragmatism has any particular relevance for politics. Now, it is accused of having a commitment to democracy so thick that it is no longer appropriate for a pluralistic nation. In this article, I discuss a recent turn inward among those who seek a pragmatic, epistemic defense of democracy and argue that there is sufficient room for the contending strands of the pragmatic tradition.The recent attempt to derive a pragmatic-epistemic defense of democracy is part of the broader effort to develop an argument on behalf of democracy while acknowledging that our world is increasingly pluralistic. We may not assume that citizens of modern, democratic nation-states will share an image of the good life. For democrats, this poses a special problem, since they want to believe that their position is rationally defensible at the same time that they want to respect those who reasonably disagree. PHILLIP DEEN 132Rather than attempt to eliminate the fact of moral disagreement, contemporary democratic theory has often tried to find the ground of democracy within moral disagreement itself. Whether it is John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas or the pragmatic theorists Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, there is a shared project to derive democratic principles from the structure of moral argumentation, rather than the content of any particular moral doctrine. Habermas and Apel argue that principles of justice -requiring that we seek mutual agreement rather than sheer victory, that there be the greatest possible inclusion of speakers, and that communication be undistorted by any power other than that of the better argument -are embedded in communicative action itself, and any communicator who denies them is engaged in a performative contradiction, whether they are aware of it or not. To act undemocratically is to act irrat...

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This article discusses whether a sense of humor is a political virtue. It argues that a sense of humor is conducive to the central political virtues. We must first, however, delineate different types of humor (benevolent or malicious) and the different political virtues (sociability, prudence, and justice) to which they correspond. Generally speaking, a sense of humor is politically virtuous when it encourages good will toward fellow citizens, an awareness of the limits of power, and a tendency not to take oneself too seriously or when it condemns moral or intellectual vice. An analysis of President Donald Trump's deeply flawed sense of humor is used to ground this account.

This article discusses whether a sense of humor is a political virtue. It argues that a sense of humor is conducive to the central political virtues. We must first, however, delineate different types of humor (benevolent or malicious) and the different political virtues (sociability, prudence, and justice) to which they correspond. Generally speaking, a sense of humor is politically virtuous when it encourages good will toward fellow citizens, an awareness of the limits of power, and a tendency not to take oneself too seriously or when it condemns moral or intellectual vice. An analysis of President Donald Trumps deeply flawed sense of humor is used to ground this account.