In recent years scholars have grown increasingly interested in the potential for a contentious environmental movement in China. This article explores the beliefs of university students in Beijing and finds that there is little likelihood of environmentalism among students transforming into an independent grassroots movement or becoming a source of pressure for political change.

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Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have increasingly tumed their attention to examining the link between depletion of renewable resources and conflict. Within this environmental security literature, academic opinion varies across a wide spectrum with some predicting a dark future of environmental "resource wars" both between and within nations, while others question the extent to which environmental variables play any role in inducing conflict. This paper builds on the findings of previous case and statistical studies and presents a cross-national, time-series multivariate analysis of the relationship between militarized international disputes and the environmental variables most commonly cited in the qualitative literature-freshwater, soil, fish, and population. These environmental variables are tested individually and in combination, while controlling for other conflict-generating factors. The general finding is that states suffering from greater levels of environmental scarcity are more likely to be involved in a militarized international dispute.

Through more than two decades of multilateral climate change negotiations, China has steadfastly opposed emission limits for developing countries. Scholars have traditionally explained the rigidity of Chinese diplomacy with reference to economic interests and power, and in the process understated the importance of equity norms. In international negotiations, China has served as one of the key architects and promoters of the common but differentiated responsibility principle, which holds that global environmental justice requires that developed countries bear the primary obligation for combating climate change. China has used this principle strategically in order to legitimize its opposition to emission limits. However, China's negotiating stance cannot be defined simply as the instrumental use of norms, as Beijing is genuinely sensitive to issues of equity. These equity concerns have occasionally led China to act in a manner that, from a strict cost-benefit analysis, runs counter to its own economic interests. In sum, notions of environmental justice are simultaneously a tool China uses to pursue its interests and a force that structures China's interest.

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