The idea that not all autocracies are alike is increasingly accepted in international relations research. However, compared to the study of war initiation or crisis bargaining, the implication of autocratic regime types is not immediately clear in the study of economic sanctions as a coercive tool of diplomacy. In this paper, I argue that the effectiveness of sanction threats can be explained by the size of domestic audience, which differentiates between personalist targets on the one hand, and non-personalist and democratic targets on the other. Since personalist leaders are less constrained by their domestic audience, personalist targets are less likely to concede to sanction threats compared to other types of regimes. However, this mechanism requires a potential sanction to be costly to the general population, so the relationship is conditioned on the target's trade dependence.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
customersupport@researchsolutions.com
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
Copyright © 2025 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.