PurposeThis research focuses on the demand from medium-sized firms to access public equity as a source of finance. The acceptance of public equity differs strongly between countries, particularly between the United Kingdom and Germany. Therefore, this research aims to identify the impact of national culture on the decision to go public in these two countries.Design/methodology/approachThe theoretical framework builds on the satisficing theory of rationality, the pecking-order theory as well as Hofstede's cultural dimension theory. Using a questionnaire, over 1,000 medium-sized businesses in the United Kingdom and Germany were surveyed.FindingsThe findings demonstrate that British medium-sized firms are more open to using public equity as a source of finance than their German counterparts. The results indicate that national culture not only affects the decision to go public but also has a negative impact on uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation.Originality/valueThe originality of the research lies in the focus on medium-sized firms and the effects of cultural differences between the United Kingdom and Germany. No previous research has explored how culture influences the decision to go public using a dataset generated from medium-sized firms in the United Kingdom and Germany.

Over the past 15 years, a fairly synchronised and steady increase of the current account deficits of the US and the UK has been witnessed, while at the same time real house prices and real wages in these two economies increased sharply. We analyse the offspring of the economic crisis of 2008 within the framework of Minsky's theory of financial crisis, and identify the reasons behind this development as the global imbalances. Our empirical results show that overconsumption in the US and UK caused unsustainable growth, which manifested first in real wage inflation. Within this development, neither the financial sector nor failed regulation is to blame, as financial intermediaries merely fulfilled their requirements as the vehicle between borrowers and lenders. Instead, we argue, our 'need' for overconsumption is to blame, and policy makers are required to address this issue as soon as possible in order to avoid another, probably more severe crisis in the long-run.

The time horizon is limited due to the lack of Chinese data. The results show that both economies used leasing to finance ongoing business and both markets have many common features. The results show also that although the Chinese leasing market is less developed, it catches up with the more developed Polish counterpart.

The paper is devoted to the field of pension systems. It puts forward the argument that, the size of resources directed towards the retired is not dependent on their economic form but on the readiness of those working to support those who are retired. Economics, therefore, plays only a secondary role as the economic mechanism is identical no matter what organisational form is chosen. In order to demonstrate this three organisational models are presented: family, pay-as-you-go and funded. Through the comparison of macroeconomic flows in all three of them, it is concluded that they are, in fact, identical to the resulting outcome point of view. The final conclusion, therefore, is that any system is just a means of dividing the current national product among the two groups and the size of resources devoted to pensioners is controlled and determined by the working population.

Over the past 15 years, a fairly synchronised and steady increase of the current account deficits of the US and the UK has been witnessed, while at the same time real house prices and real wages in these two economies increased sharply. We analyse the offspring of the economic crisis of 2008 within the framework of Minsky's theory of financial crisis, and identify the reasons behind this development as the global imbalances. Our empirical results show that overconsumption in the US and UK caused unsustainable growth, which manifested first in real wage inflation. Within this development, neither the financial sector nor failed regulation is to blame, as financial intermediaries merely fulfilled their requirements as the vehicle between borrowers and lenders. Instead, we argue, our 'need' for overconsumption is to blame, and policy makers are required to address this issue as soon as possible in order to avoid another, probably more severe crisis in the long-run.