The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has slowed down economies, upended societies, and tremendously affected the daily lives of ordinary people throughout the world. In the international context, various government responses have thus given rise to many political debates and discussions centered around the handling of these impacts and the novel coronavirus itself. Here, emphasis is often placed on how regime type (i.e., democratic or non-democratic) and governance quality influence policies aimed at responding to the ongoing crisis. By examining relevant scientific resources, including the COVID-19 Global Response Index (developed by FP Analytics), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and Bjørnskov-Rode regime data, this study found that regime type was indeed related to governmental policy responses to COVID-19. Results specifically showed that governance quality (especially effectiveness) had moderate impacts on how well these policies were implemented. Due to several limitations, however, these findings should be regarded as preliminary evidence.

The Mekong region is witnessing a regional order reconfiguration triggered by the China-led Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). Little research is available regarding the history of this sub-regional grouping, particularly about its formation. Using sources from a recently opened archive in Bangkok, this article reappraises the origins and evolution of the initiative within the lens of regional group formation theory. Findings show that LMC is a revised version of Thailand's proposal for the formation of a dialogue on the management of the Mekong River that was initially dismissed by China. As China under Xi Jinping-era claimed great power status with a droit de regard over the near abroad, it has used the LMC to exercise exclusive leadership over the Mekong region. This can be seen in the preparation of institutional infrastructure for the construction of a China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) as part of China's wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy.

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Thailand–China relations have often been described metaphorically as fraternal, signifying the special place China has in Thai foreign policy. However, Sino–Thai brotherly friendship is an illusion. Based on archival evidence recently made available in Bangkok, this study provides a new account of Thailand’s relations with China in the 1990s, usually described by scholars as the period of partnership. This study argues that during this period, Thai foreign policy vis-a-vis China was almost exclusively driven by the Kingdom’s national interests, framed by its consistent diplomatic mentality over time. Specifically, the primacy of national interest was a modus operandi of Thailand’s China policy. Notably, Bangkok policymakers viewed China’s expanding role and influence in mainland Southeast Asia and throughout Asia as a long-term threat to the Kingdom’s security. Thus, ironically, China and Thailand might not be termed brothers but possibly in a distant fraternal relationship that some might categorize as “others.”

Thailand four years after the coup: the struggle against the dissentersPoowin Bunyavejchewin ♣ After the 2006 coup d'état, there were many unusual incidents in Thailand, some of which involved considerable bloodshed, which originated from clashes between those in power and dissenters. This article examines how political institutions in Thailand are structured, and the author argues that, in order to effectively assess the state of Thai politics after the coup, an analysis of the structures of political legitimacy in the country is essential. The author will be exploring the way in which political legitimacy is generally determined by the established power holders, especially the monarchy and its allies. The ideologies and beliefs of recent dissenters will also be examined in detail.