The location service is an important component of position-based routing protocols, used for VANETs. A hierarchical structured location service called Map Based Location Service (MBLS) is proposed in this paper. The MBLS exploits navigation system by using Geographical Data File (GDF) from the digital-map database to recruit location servers and to send location updates. Simulation results show that MBLS can achieve higher location query success ratio with lower location update and query cost. Further, the accuracy level of the position information in the reply message to the actual position of the mobile node is less than 50m.

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Abstract-Whereas prefix hijacking is usually examined from security perspectives, this paper looks at it from a novel economic angle. Our study stems from an observation that a transit AS (Autonomous System) has a financial interest in attracting extra traffic to the links with its customers. Based on real data about the actual hijacking incident in the Internet, we conduct simulations in the real AS-level Internet topology with synthetic demands for the hijacked traffic. Then, we measure traffic on all inter-AS links and compute the payments of all providers. The analysis of our results from technical, business, and legal viewpoints suggests that hijacking-based traffic attraction is a viable strategy that can create a fertile ground for tussles between providers. In particular, giant top-tier providers appear to have the strongest financial incentives to hijack popular prefixes and then deliver the intercepted traffic to the proper destinations. We also discuss directions for future research in the area of hijacking-based traffic attraction.

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Abstract-Internet transit is an economy where providers sell traffic-delivery services. Traffic attraction refers to BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) techniques enabling an AS (Autonomous System) to receive traffic that would otherwise flow elsewhere. Unlike prior studies that present security perspectives on traffic attraction or deal with economic considerations in game-theoretic settings, this paper focuses on the economics of customer-traffic attraction by transit providers and report extensive simulations in an Internet-scale model configured with realistic data on traffic, topology, and pricing. We consider traffic attraction by tier-1, tier-2, and tier-3 networks with 3 types of reactions by other networks: filtering, customer-disconnections, and attempts of losing ASes to attract traffic to themselves. Our results demonstrate that transit providers can derive substantial financial benefits from attracting customer traffic, with tier-1 networks being in the strongest position to do so. The traffic attraction remains effective despite the countermeasures unless participation in them is broad.