In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics – fundamental essentialism – according to which individuals just are realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic contingentists propositions are true require possible worlds whose domain contain merely possible individuals. In light of this problem, Plantinga has developed modal metaphysics based on essences, but it has been claimed by Fine, Williamson, and others, that it cannot be upheld because of the problem of unexemplified essences. We answer the latter problem by claiming that individuals just are realized essences. Then, justifying our theory further we refute Williamson’s deductive argument for necessitism. Afterward, we show in what sense fundamental essentialism is contingentist metaphysics.

Timothy Williamson, the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford, is one of the leading figures in the contemporary analytic philosophy. His areas of research include philosophy of language, epistemology, logic, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. Professor Williamson has authored over two hundred articles and numerous books, including such modern classics as Vagueness (Routledge 1994), Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford, 2000), The Philosophy of Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell 2007, 2 nd updated ed. 2021), and Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford, 2013).I had the pleasure to meet Professor Williamson at The 26 th Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference, and he kindly agreed to give an interview on matters of modality. The enjoyable and fruitful a few hourtalk that we had, which appears below slightly abridged, revolved around the history of modal logics, Saul Kripke and his works, the controversy between necessitists and contingentists, higher-order logics and metaphysics, and the influence of Modal Logic as Metaphysics.The interview was taken on a rainy afternoon on Monday, the 14 th of November 2022, at New College, Oxford.PG: Why do modal notions (necessity, possibility, etc.) play an important role in philosophical inquiries?TW: One simple thing to say is that philosophers typically want what they say to be necessarily, and not just accidentally or contingently, true. We can see that in the way that they take merely possible counterexamples to what they are saying very seriously and as potential objections. That would not be the case if philosophers were putting forward what they say simply as universal generalizations. So that is one generic reason why modality is important in philosophy.Another reason, I think, has to do with the fact that modality itself presents both epistemic and metaphysical challenges to philosophers -it is not clear what is the place of possibility in reality, and it is not clear how can we know about things which are non-actual. One can see how serious these challenges are by looking, for example, at how difficult itContents lists available at Vilnius University Press

In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for successful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.

Iš anglų kalbos vertė ir pratarmę parašė Pranciškus Gricius, Vilniaus universitetas