Recently, Bodur, Del Pia, Dey, Molinaro and Pokutta introduced the concept of aggregation cuts for packing and covering integer programs. The aggregation closure is the intersection of all aggregation cuts. Bodur et. al. studied the strength of this closure, but left open the question of whether the aggregation closure is polyhedral. In this paper, we answer this question in the positive, i.e. we show that the aggregation closure is polyhedral. Finally, we demonstrate that a generalization, the k-aggregation closure, is also polyhedral for all k.

In the single winner determination problem, we have n voters and m candidates and each voter j incurs a cost c(i, j) if candidate i is chosen. Our objective is to choose a candidate that minimizes the expected total cost incurred by the voters; however as we only have access to the agents' preference rankings over the outcomes, a loss of efficiency is inevitable. This loss of efficiency is quantified by distortion. We give an instance of the metric single winner determination problem for which any randomized social choice function has distortion at least 2.063164. This disproves the long-standing conjecture that there exists a randomized social choice function that has a worst-case distortion of at most 2.

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