Increasing environmental degradation has forced policymakers to include sustainability in the economic growth agenda. Green finance has attracted the attention of policymakers and the industry, but the impact of green finance on social and environmental sustainability has not been confirmed. This study uses the panel data of 34 Chinese provinces to investigate the relationship between green finance and environmental degradation. The fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) method is utilized to analyze the mixed effect of green finance on CO 2 emissions. These factors include green innovation, green insurance, green investment, and industrial structure. The results show that exogenous demand factors, including green insurance and industrial structure, have auxiliary effects when endogenous demand factors, including green investment and green innovation, exist as the core antecedent conditions among green finance and environmental degradation. Finally, the policymakers should encourage financial technology to actively participate in environmental protection initiatives that promote green consumption while minimizing the systemic risks caused by financial technology.

Abstract-In addition to the security investment, security information sharing among firms has been proved to be an effective measure. In order to enhance the level of information security and improve the social welfare, this paper studies how to promote sharing through a certain reasonable incentive mechanism. We adopt the repeated game theory to establish incentive mechanism and analyze how similarity, isolation period, discount factor, proportion of rational firms and so on effect the efficiency of this incentive mechanism. We finally conclude the conditions required by the effective mechanism.Keywords-Security Information; Repeated Game; Incentive Mechanism; Sharing I.INTRODUCTION In order to enhance the level of common information security, we certainly should invest enough in our own information security management.Besides that, strengthening the security information sharing with partners is equally important. This has led China to set up a national security vulnerabilities information sharing platform; U.S. federal government has encouraged the establishment of industry-based information sharing and analysis center to facilitate the sharing of security information to enhance and protect critical cyber infrastructures. A specific example of security information sharing is the Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) (https://www.it-isac.org) which aims at facilitating the sharing of information on cyber-security threats and vulnerabilities. Platform-building is only the beginning. The key problem is how to make the best use of the platform. The performance of platform depends on the willingness of members to share security information. In this context, our paper will design an incentive mechanism based on repeated game theory in order to enhance the willingness of security information sharing and ultimately maximize the effectiveness of sharing platform.Questions on information sharing have been previously studied in different context of organizations. Information security is interdependent [1], security information is treated as a hybrid between public and private goods [2][3] and security strategies are divided into two components: self-protection (e.g., firewall, IDS) and self-insurance (e.g., having good backups). Self-protection denotes the ability to decrease the probability of successful attack by hackers [4].To improve the efficiency of self-protection, it is an effective way to share security information each other [5]. Designing incentive compatible mechanisms that lead to efficient production of public goods has long been an important topic in the theoretical literature on public economics. Mutuswami and Winter (2004) propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. As far as security information is concerned, Varian [3]points out that during the period of security information sharing the nature of information assets possessed by two firms, either complementary or substitutable, plays a crucial role in influencing decisions of sharing or...

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In addition to the security investment, security information sharing among firms has been proved to be an effective measure. In order to enhance the level of information security and improve the social welfare, this paper studies how to promote sharing through a certain reasonable incentive mechanism. We adopt the repeated game theory to establish incentive mechanism and analyze how similarity, isolation period, discount factor, proportion of rational firms and so on effect the efficiency of this incentive mechanism. We finally conclude the conditions required by the effective mechanism.

The global network threat is becoming more and more serious, and network security vulnerability management has become one of the critical areas in the national information security emergency system construction. To guide the third-party sharing platforms regarding network security vulnerability management, this work constructs a signal game model comprising third-party vulnerability sharing platforms and software vendors for vulnerability collaborative disclosures. In addition, we analyze the game strategy selection and its influencing factors. The results show that there are two perfect Bayesian equilibria, including separation equilibrium and mixed equilibrium, due to the incomplete lines of information disclosure. The equilibrium state is mainly based on the compression time of the protection period and the existence ratio of the software vendors who develop the patches in the market. This work puts forward some suggestions in terms of the protection period, reputation loss, and relevant laws and regulations.