In the context of increasingly prominent rural environmental problems, the third-party pollution governance model has become an important initiative for the comprehensive governance of rural environmental problems in China. However, the current third-party governance initiatives continue to suffer from governance failures caused by unclear responsibility sharing and opportunistic behavior. To analyze the reasons behind the behavioral choices of the various stakeholders involved in rural environmental third-party governance and to provide policy insights for formulating more reasonable rural environmental third-party governance solutions, a game model was constructed between local governments and third-party governance institutions. Specifically, the model examined the different evolutionary game strategies that appear between local governments and third-party governance institutions in different institutional design contexts when responsibility disputes arise in third-party governance. These disputes involve the re-governing of pollution control responsibility, which can be borne either by the local governments or the party causing the damage. The results shown are as follows: It is crucial to define the boundaries of re-governance responsibility in the third-party governance of rural environmental pollution. When local governments bear the primary responsibility for governance, regardless of whether they provide regulatory oversight, third-party governance institutions tend to adopt a passive approach. In such cases, the third-party governance market fails to effectively fulfill its role in governance. By reconstructing the third-party governance market model and dividing the main responsibility for pollution governance among the damaging parties, it is possible to achieve active governance by third-party governance institutions without the need for regulation by local governments.

Improving the efficiency of green development is an important means of achieving high-quality development, and the optimal allocation of financial resources is the core factor in promoting green development. Based on the panel data of 30 provinces in China taken from 2005 to 2021, this paper constructs a financial resource misallocation (FM) index and green development efficiency (GDE) measurement system, empirically examining the impact and transmission path of FM on the GDE from the dual perspectives of financial resource element mismatch and structural mismatch. First, the results show that financial misallocation is the key factor inhibiting the improvement of GDE, and with the improvement of GDE, the inhibitory effect of financial misallocation decreases first and then increases in an inverted V-shaped trend. Second, the inhibitory effect of financial resource structure mismatch on GDE is greater than that of financial resource element mismatch. Moreover, after the degree of financial marketization is distinguished, this inhibitory effect is more evident in the regions with a low degree of financial marketization. Third, through mechanism analysis, we found that FM affects the improvement of GDE by inhibiting financial resource agglomeration through enterprise technological innovation and industrial structure height.

The Chinese government encourages farmers to enter the forestry property market for forestry property trading and promotes the standardization of the forestry property trading market. Unfortunately, the development of the forestry property market is still very slow. Farmers are the most important subject of mountain and forest management and the micro foundation of forestry property market operation, and their active market participation is the key to the healthy development of forestry property market. Based on the theory of planned behavior, this paper used the survey data of farmers in collective forest areas in three southern provinces of China to reveal the psychological decision-making process of farmers entering the forestry property market by structural equation model (SEM). The research results show that: (1) Farmers’ behavioral attitudes (AB), subjective norms (SN) and perceptual behavioral control (PBC) positively influence farmers’ willingness to enter the forestry property market. (2) An important reason why farmers’ intentions are largely not effectively translated into behavior is the constraint of PBC. (3) Reducing the risk of transfer and maintaining the interests of both parties constitute the main factors of AB, and the greatest external pressure on farmers’ willingness to enter the forestry property market comes from the opinions of village collectives. (4) PBC has a significant impact on behavior, where unfamiliarity with the forestry property market is the main factor affecting farmers’ PBC. Therefore, the government should further strengthen the propaganda of forestry property right market, improve the market service system, reduce the transaction cost, introduce specific encouragement policies and measures, and effectively consider farmers’ interest demands on forestry property trading; in addition, the power of grassroots organizations should be emphasized when formulating forestry property trading policies.