With the rapid development of the digital economy and the increasingly severe environmental issues, the role of the digital economy in green innovation has been attracting more attention; however, only a limited amount of research has been done in this area. Therefore, based on matching data at the city and manufacturing enterprise level in China during 2011–2018, this paper attempted to integrate the digital economy (more specifically, the Internet and digital finance) with resource allocation and green technology innovation together in a unified scheme. Our study confirmed that the digital economy could significantly promote green technology innovation by manufacturing enterprises, but that digital finance was the dominant feature. Resource allocation efficiency played a partial mediating role between digital economy and green technology innovation. Furthermore, considering the heterogeneity in enterprise ownership and industrial pollution, the digital economy had a more positive effect on green technology innovation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and high pollution industries. As for the heterogeneity of region, the Internet significantly contributed to green technology innovation in regions with different levels of development. In the eastern region of China, especially, the influence of digital finance on green technology innovation was more significant. In view of these findings, this study provides important insights for strengthening the integration of the digital economy with green transformation, emphasizing the rationality of resource allocation, and formulating policies for different enterprises.

No abstract

Based on the general reality that new media with massive information and strong interactivity play an increasingly prominent role in marine ecological governance, this study introduces the coastal public participation mechanism under the new media environment. Furthermore, based on the assumption of limited rationality, an evolutionary game model among local governments, marine enterprises, and the coastal public is constructed to explore the changes in game strategies among the three participating subjects over time. Then, we used MATLAB to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stabilization strategies under different parameters by combining our research data on governments at all levels, marine enterprises, and the coastal public in 14 cities in coastal areas of China. The study shows that: 1) an objective and a fair new media environment exert a positive guiding effect on marine ecological governance, whereas a false and distorted one will lead to chaos in marine ecological governance. 2) Considering the high accuracy of new media reports, the higher the sensitivity of the local governments and marine enterprises to media reports, the more inclined they are toward strong regulation and active governance. 3) The local governments can effectively restrain the marine hazard behavior of the marine enterprises by increasing penalties and environmental protection taxes, and it is equally important to guide marine enterprises to fully utilize high and new technology in the marine industry for improving economic benefits and reducing governance costs. 4) Coastal public participation can effectively compensate for the local governments’ regulatory loopholes and can reduce the cost of government regulation. Therefore, for ensuring objective reports of new media by establishing reward and punishment mechanisms and regularly selecting excellent new media, using new media to enhance the level of marine publicity and education to encourage the coastal public to widely and fully participate in marine ecological governance is an effective means.

The choice of environmental regulation strategies for marine ecological pollution governance is vital for China’s promotion of collaborative marine ecological management. First, based on the assumption of limited rationality, we established a three-party evolutionary game model of China’s central government, local governments, and marine enterprises from the perspective of environmental policy to explore the dynamic evolution process of the game strategies of the three participants and the stability of the system equilibrium point. Second, we used numerical simulations to investigate how the incentive- and penalty-based policies of central and local governments have different effects on local governments and marine enterprises, respectively. Finally, we introduced a reputation loss model of public participation to explore the game strategy choices of the three parties under public participation. The finding reveal that (1) Local governments are more sensitive to the central government’s punishment policies than marine enterprises are. (2) Increasing the punishment of local governments on enterprises can simultaneously enhance the willingness of enterprises to govern and the willingness of local governments to implement. Moreover, the local governments policy of punishing enterprises was more direct and effective than that of the central government. (3) Although local governments subsidies for marine enterprises can increase their probability of governing marine ecology, they can also decrease local governments' willingness to implement. Finally, (4) Public participation can quickly promote the active governance of marine enterprises. Accordingly, the suggestions are proposed to maintain China's marine ecological security, e.g., the central government should focus on urging local governments to strictly implement marine environmental protection policies; local governments should take the lead in supervising and guiding marine enterprises; and all levels of government need to take measures to promote public participation in marine ecological governance.