This paper, examining the Pilot Free Trade Zone Lin-Gang Special Area in China (Shanghai), identifies the relationship between urban expansion and habitat change and analyzes the influence mechanism of habitat quality (HQ) on spatiotemporal distribution. The results show the following: (1) From 2002 to 2019, the HQ in the study area decreased significantly, and the spatial differences gradually expanded over time. The HQ was low in the southwest and high in the northeast, and low-level habitats gradually moved to the southwest. This spatiotemporal evolutionary law was consistent with the local government's 2003–2020 plans, which are composed of the joint development of a logistics park in the north, the Lin-Gang industrial zone in the west, and Shanghai port in the south. (2) Due to the interspersed distribution of high and low habitats caused by urban development and expansion, Moran's index in spatial autocorrelation decreased over time, which means the spatial agglomeration of HQ decreased and that homogeneity increased. (3) The spatial distribution of HQ was quantified by landscape analysis. The results showed that the fragmentation degree in high-level habitat areas increased with time, while the middle-level habitat areas first increased and then decreased, and the low-level habitat areas displayed the opposite change in trend to that of the middle habitat.

No abstract

No abstract

Abstract-Macropolicy regulation and microeconomic regulation of electricity regulatory power are disparate types of powers in legal principles. The former has the property of quasi-legislative power but the latter has the property of both executive power and quasi-judicial po wer, which determine that it is supposed to allocate the above-mentioned different powers to different regulators according to the principle of checks and balance. After state electricity regulatory commission (serc) was established, the allocation structure that the administration is separated from supervising decentralized out of place when allocating the core economy regulatory power like electricity pricing to policy regulators, which didn't achieve the checks and balances; it radically abandons the allocation principles to repeal the current allocation structure of serc and allocate these two regulatory powers to the same regulator. Only relocating the policy and economy functions of electricity regulation in the light of independent regulation and energy regulation's patterns can it establish a basis to make china get rid of the trouble that the electricity regulation is invalid.Keywords-the electricity regulation; the power allocation; checks and balance; the separation of government and supervising