PurposeIn this paper, the moderating roles of leader reward omission and person–supervisor fit in the relationship between job autonomy and knowledge hiding are investigated.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of 248 employees in a two-wave survey, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypotheses.FindingsThe results revealed that employees with high job autonomy were less likely to engage in knowledge hiding. Moreover, when employees experienced leader reward omission, the negative relationship between job autonomy and knowledge hiding was weakened, and this interesting effect varied by person–supervisor fit.Research limitations/implicationsThis study does not explore the mediating mechanism by which job autonomy affects employee knowledge hiding. Moreover, as this research was conducted in a Chinese context, the generalizability of our findings is unclear.Practical implicationsThis research has fulfilled its practical aims by providing advice on knowledge-relevant job characteristic factors that can be used to stage interventions regarding the provision of autonomy in jobs, and by carefully considering how to create interdependence between jobs without pushing people to engage in knowledge-hiding behaviors. Furthermore, it is important for leaders to help employees identify work goals and directions and not engage in reward omission.Originality/valueThis study contributes to theoretical advancements in the field of knowledge hiding by revealing boundary conditions that mitigate or enhance the impact of job autonomy on knowledge hiding.

We investigated the potential mechanisms of the uncoupling of EGFR from its downstream signals in colorectal cancer (CRC) cells. Alternative growth factor receptors and regulation of downstream pathways in different gefitinib-responsive cell lines were determined. Basal insulin-like growth factor receptor-1β (IGFR-1β) phosphorylation was undetectable or present at very low levels in highly gefitinib-responsive cell lines and was present at strikingly high levels in less responsive cell lines. Further analysis of cell lines representing the most sensitive (Lovo), moderately sensitive (HT29), and most resistant (HCT116) strains was treated with an IGFR-1 inhibitor (AG1024), gefitinib, or both, revealing that elevated IGFR-1β phosphorylation can compensate for the loss of EGFR signaling function. Increased insulin-like growth factor II expression induced by gefitinib or heterodimerization of EGFR and IGFR-1β may trigger IGFR-1β signal transduction via activation of Akt and MAPK. In addition, high levels of EGFR and IGFR-1β phosphorylation were detected in CRC tumor tissue. We also showed that gefitinib- and/or AG1024-induced cytostatic effects could be mediated by glycogen synthase kinase-3β (GSK-3β) activation. Our data suggest that the crosstalk between EGFR and IGFR-1β signaling are likely to contribute to resistance of CRC cells to gefitinib and that measurement of GSK-3β activation may present a potential biomarker for evaluating the antitumor efficacy of receptor tyrosine kinase inhibition.

PurposeThe authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage moderates those effects.Design/methodology/approachEmploying fixed effects models, the authors test hypotheses based on Chinese listed company data from 2011 to 2017.FindingsControlling shareholders' stock pledges has a negative effect on strategic change. As the balance of power among shareholders and/or analyst coverage increases, it mitigates the effect of controlling shareholder stock pledges on strategic change. In particular, the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage weakened the relationship between controlling shareholder stock pledges and strategic change. Lastly, after distinguishing family from nonfamily firms, the authors discovered that these findings only held for family firms.Originality/valueThis study makes important contributions to strategic change, stock pledge and family firm literature, and also provides guidance on firms' strategic change practices.

PurposeNoncontrolling large shareholders can reduce the agency problem of executives and can reduce the expropriation or tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, thereby promoting corporate innovation. However, too many noncontrolling large shareholders may also lead to excessive supervision, thereby inhibiting innovative activities that contribute to the long-term value of the firm. Research to date, however, has not examined the nonlinear impact of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation. Based on principal–agent theory and the too-much-of-a-good-thing (TMGT) effect, the authors discuss the inverted U-shaped influence of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation and the moderating effect of industry competition and corporate product diversification on the above relationship.Design/methodology/approachBased on the empirical data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2017, the authors use the bidirectional fixed effects model to conduct empirical testing and robustness testing of the research hypotheses.FindingsThere is an inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation; type I and type II agency costs play a mediating role between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation. In addition, firm product diversification weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation, but industry competition has no significant moderating effect on the above relationship.Practical implicationsThis research has important implications for policy makers, to better activate corporate innovation vitality, and investors, to better choose investment targets. Specifically, investors and policy makers should be aware that an appropriate increase in larger noncontrolling shareholders can maximize the enthusiasm of firms for innovation and enhance corporate value, but they should also realize that having too many noncontrolling large shareholders may backfire.Originality/valueThis research helps the authors to understand the pros and cons of increasing the number of noncontrolling large shareholders more comprehensively and also helps to understand corporate innovation more comprehensively from a supervisory perspective. In addition, this research also enhances the explanatory and predictive power of the TMGT effect.

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