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Despite the ubiquitous nature of boredom, the definition, function, and correlates of boredom are still poorly understood. In this review, we summarize the "known" (consistent evidence) and "unknown" (inconsistent evidence) correlates of boredom. We show that boredom is consistently related to negative affect, task-unrelated thought, over-estimation of elapsed time, reduced agency, as well as to over- and under-stimulation. Activation of the default mode network was consistent across the few available fMRI studies, while the recruitment of other brain areas such as the hippocampus and anterior insular cortex, was a notable but less consistent correlate of boredom. Other less consistent correlates of boredom are also reviewed, such as the level of arousal and the mental attributions given to fluctuations of attention. Finally, we identify two critical factors that may contribute to current inconsistencies in the literature and may hamper further progress in the field. First, there is relatively little consistency in the way in which boredom has been operationalized across studies to date, with operationalizations of boredom ranging from negative affect paired with under-stimulation, over-stimulation, to negative affect paired with a lack of goal-directed actions. Second, preliminary evidence suggests the existence of distinct types of boredom (e.g., searching vs. apathetic) that may have different and sometimes even opposing correlates. Adopting a more precise and consistent way of operationalizing boredom, and arriving at an empirically validated taxonomy of different types of boredom, could serve to overcome the current roadblocks to facilitate further progress in our scientific understanding of boredom.

Iconic representations are ubiquitous; they fill children’s cartoons, add humor to newspapers, and bring emotional tone to online communication. Yet, the communicative function they serve remains unaddressed by cognitive psychology. Here, we examined the hypothesis that iconic representations communicate emotional information more efficiently than their realistic counterparts. In Experiment 1, we manipulated low-level features of emotional faces to create five sets of stimuli that ranged from photorealistic to fully iconic. Participants identified emotions on briefly presented faces. Results showed that, at short presentation times, accuracy for identifying emotion on more “cartoonized” images was enhanced. In addition, increasing contrast and decreasing featural complexity benefited accuracy. In Experiment 2, we examined an event-related potential component, the P1, which is sensitive to low-level visual stimulus features. Lower levels of contrast and complexity within schematic stimuli were also associated with lower P1 amplitudes. These findings support the hypothesis that iconic representations differ from realistic images in their ability to communicate specific information, including emotion, quickly and efficiently, and that this effect is driven by changes in low-level visual features in the stimuli.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s41235-016-0021-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Although central to well-being, functional and dysfunctional thoughts arise and unfold over time in ways that remain poorly understood. To shed light on these mechanisms, we adapted a “think aloud” paradigm to quantify the content and dynamics of individuals’ thoughts at rest. Across two studies, external raters hand coded the content of each thought and computed dynamic metrics spanning duration, transition probabilities between affective states, and conceptual similarity over time. Study 1 highlighted the paradigm’s high ecological validity and revealed a narrowing of conceptual scope following more negative content. Study 2 replicated Study 1’s findings and examined individual difference predictors of trait brooding, a maladaptive form of rumination. Across individuals, increased trait brooding was linked to thoughts rated as more negative, past-oriented and self-focused. Longer negative and shorter positive thoughts were also apparent as brooding increased, as well as a tendency to shift away from positive conceptual states, and a stronger narrowing of conceptual scope following negative thoughts. Importantly, content and dynamics explained independent variance, accounting for a third of the variance in brooding. These results uncover a real-time cognitive signature of rumination and highlight the predictive and ecological validity of the think aloud paradigm applied to resting state cognition.

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