PurposeThis article provides a plain language commentary on the distributive equity structure of the English Premier League (EPL) with the aim of introducing sport business practitioners to a foundational challenge facing professional leagues as they grow financially with market opportunities, namely financial inequality between clubs.Design/methodology/approachIntroducing and discussing data from seasons 2009/10–2018/19, the article reveals that despite maintaining a consistent distribution of the EPL prize fund over time, the financial imbalance within the league has grown throughout the period.FindingsThe EPL's financial distributive equity is exacerbated by growing imparity in the acquisition of sponsorship revenues, the distribution of broadcasting revenues and the implications of policies concerning financial fair play and parachute payments, leading to a problematic differential in the talent distribution and win–wage relationship experienced by the top six teams and the remainder.Practical implicationsThe EPL's market-driven continuation of its revenue allocation policies has led to a broadening financial imbalance, in favour of the top clubs, which could paradoxically undermine the financial security of the teams and league. Sport business practitioners should be familiar with this fundamental challenge for sport leagues that accompanies financial growth.Originality/valueWhilst the percentage difference in prize fund allocation between top and bottom clubs appears minor, there is a significant financial variation across the league, primarily due to the large increase in broadcasting income. This is compounded by positive feedback via the relative dominance of the top six clubs receiving the larger share allocated to higher finishing teams.

The communication from Mr. Jensen on characteristics of investment criteria (Vol. XX, p. 251, May 1969) raises a number of important questions. What Mr. Jensen does is to examine whether differences in the scale, timing or rate of investment will show up as differences in a ranking order according to three criteria, namely the net present value; the ratio of present benefits to present costs; or the internal rate of return. In other words, do these criteria, if applied to a given project, enable us to say which of possible scales, timings or rates of investment in that project would be preferable? What we want to know is, is it better to undertake more, or less, investment? Is i t better to start the project now, or later? Is it better to pursue investment more rapidly, or less rapidly?Mr. Jensen sets himself to examine which of the criteria mentioned is helpful in answering these questions. His conclusion is that only "Net Present Value" is a meaningful guide. This is a conclusion which would be of fundamental importance if it were of general application. However, the contention in this "comment" is that it is not. It is valid only under the conditions stated by Mr. Jensen in his note. These conditions are not applicable to macro-projects. Indeed, Mr. Jensen himself points out that much of his analysis is not appropriate for macroprojects, but this limitation is not perhaps always fully observed. For instance, various references throughout Mr. Jensen's note indicate that he is thinking about farm-scale investment projects, and yet his reference to the "Green Book" suggests that he wishes his remarks also to cover the sort of major investment projects to which the methodology of the "Green Book" applies.Let us now examine more closely the conditions stated by Mr. Jensen, to see whether and how they apply to macro-projects.First, when analysing the relevance of the various criteria to the scale of investment, he specifies the condition that "additional units of investment can be undertaken without alteration of the unit cash flows*". This condition is obviously not realistic for macro-projects. In macro-projects, additional units