PurposeKnowledge is the most important component of sustainable organizational growth and economic performance. This meta‐analysis aims to summarize the determinants of individuals' knowledge sharing (KS) intentions and behaviors in organizations.Design/methodology/approachThe authors organize the knowledge sharing antecedents investigated in 46 studies (n≈10,487, median n=172) into three categories, i.e. knowledge sharer intention and attitude (four variables); rewards for KS (three variables); and organizational culture (nine variables).FindingsVariables in all three antecedent categories positively contribute to KS intentions and behaviors; high between‐study variability exists, and the fail‐safe n statistic suggests the observed effects are robust against a “file drawer” (missing study) bias. Moderator results suggest that motivating KS is easier in collectivist, as opposed to individualist, cultures.Research limitations/implicationsIn most of the studies included in this meta‐analysis, participants volunteered to share knowledge with researchers. Hence, an important threat to validity in the existing research is a potential “cooperation bias” in which participants likely overestimate their willingness to share knowledge. Future KS research should investigate the dark underbelly of knowledge activities in organizations, including investigations of knowledge hoarding, withholding of knowledge to gain personal advantage, and “contributing” worthless information to gain (through gaming) personal payoffs.Originality/valueThe meta‐analysis results herein contribute to the KS literature by identifying the determinants of KS, and an important potential limitation of much existing KS research.

SUMMARY A primary concern facing the PCAOB's requirement of disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) is increased auditor litigation risk. Evidence with Key Audit Matters from the U.K. indicates auditors may subsequently remove a CAM or continue to report the same CAM for several years. Therefore, we investigate the effects of CAM removal and duration on jurors' assessments of auditor negligence when there is a subsequent material misstatement due to fraud in the account related to the CAM. Using the Culpable Control Model, we predict jurors will assess higher auditor negligence when a CAM is removed than when a CAM is reported and when a CAM is reported for multiple years than for one year. Results from two experiments support our expectations, although results vary depending on complexity of the misstated account. Overall, our findings highlight a quandary for audit firms, where subsequent removal of a CAM increases auditor liability.

PurposeThe paper seeks to extend self‐determination theory (SDT) and the triple helix model of knowledge sharing to predict that between‐industry differences in financial rewards and the quality of knowledge‐sharing motivation will explain the extent of useless, pseudo‐knowledge sharing.Design/methodology/approachParticipants are certified management accountant (CMA) survey respondents in two industries: finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE; n=52) and higher education (n=50).FindingsConsistent with predictions, the results indicate more pseudo‐knowledge sharing occurs among FIRE than among higher‐education CMAs, and, financial incentives and the quality of knowledge‐sharing motivation fully mediate the effect of industry on pseudo‐knowledge sharing.Research limitations/implicationsA larger sample, and triangulating the survey data with archival and non‐self‐reported measures, would strengthen the inferences and conclusions.Practical implicationsIndustry culture, through its influence on financial rewards and organizational knowledge culture, may affect the success or failure of organizational knowledge‐sharing initiatives.Originality/valueThis is among the first investigations to define and investigate “dark”, pseudo‐knowledge sharing, which can impede organizational goals.

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Investigating how and why accounting professionals share useless and harmful knowledge challenges designers of accounting systems and organizational leaders. In this paper, we extend self-determination theory (SDT) to investigate the influence of financial incentives on (1) harmful, and (2) masked, i.e., organizationally useless, knowledge sharing (KS) among accounting professionals (n = 428) by adapting measures from SDT to the professional accounting context. Although self-disclosed dysfunctional KS is infrequent in our sample, the results indicate that, consistent with the predictions of our extension of SDT, accountants with higher controlled (higher autonomous) motivation are more (less) influenced by financial incentives and engage in more (less) dysfunctional KS. Data Availability: Contact the authors.