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Explains why and how lawyers become involved in money laundering schemes. Describes three recent cases of UK solicitors convicted for money laundering ‐ Denis Jebb, Louis Glatt and Noel Horner ‐ and notes that US lawyers are convicted more often than in the UK; this is possibly because in the USA there are more sting operations, phone intercepts, use of accomplice evidence, and a different exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Moves on to the services that lawyers provide launderers: advice, use of client accounts, purchase or sale of property, creation of corporate vehicles and trusts, lawyer ‐ client privilege, guarantees, introductions, powers of attorney, and false legal documentation. Discusses next the low level of disclosures by solicitors in the UK of suspicious transactions; reasons may be the general culture of non‐suspicion, the duty of client confidentiality, and confusion over laundering and tax evasion. Outlines new UK money laundering offences, which are likely to lead to an increase in the numbers of solicitor prosecutions.

It is now generally recognised that, when investigating acquisitive crime, investigators must focus not just on obtaining evidence of the commission of the underlying crime itself, but also on what happened to the criminal proceeds. While there has been significant culture change in the UK so that investigators now focus to a greater degree on the proceeds of crime, this is usually from the perspective of tracing what remains of the proceeds so that the confiscation legislation may be applied. Even then such a focus is patchy and inconsistent and much work remains to be done to ensure that the confiscation legislation is applied in a rigorous manner.

Criminals have always exploited technological advances and therefore the advent of the gun, the telephone and the car created new opportunities for crime. Similarly, the increasingly widespread use of computers in society has led to computer‐related crime.

Uses open source material to examine how terrorist groups raise money for their operations, and how this can be disrupted. Discusses the costs of terrorist campaigns, the sources of terrorist funding and the laundering of terrorist finance, UK anti‐terrorism legislation, the problems for financial institutions in knowing the source of what may be quite small funds, and terrorist groups’ organisational structures and financial arrangements. Moves on to legal proceedings and the difference between evidence versus intelligence. Shows how to combine strategies, including conviction for terrorist finance offences followed by forfeiture, cash forfeiture, civil forfeiture, freezing of terrorist funds, conviction for “ordinary” criminal offences followed by confiscation, taxation, disruption by frequent inspections, and regulatory action using bureaux de change, money transmission services, and charities. Outlines the conditions for effective strategy, including cultural and structural change, and resource management, and concludes by considering a global approach, and how to measure success.