The Australian Patient Safety Foundation was formed in 1987; it was decided to set up and coordinate the Australian Incident Monitoring Study as a function of this Foundation; 90 hospitals and practices joined the study. Participating anaesthetists were invited to report, on an anonymous and voluntary basis, any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Any incident could be reported, not only those which were deemed "preventable" or were thought to involve human error. The Mark 1 AIMS form was developed which incorporated features and concepts from several other studies. All the incidents in this symposium were reported using this form, which contains general instructions to the reporter, key words and space for a narrative of the incident, structured sections for what happened (with subsections for circuitry incidents, circuitry involved, equipment involved, pharmacological incidents and airway incidents), why it happened (with subsections for factors contributing to the incident, factors minimising the incident and suggested corrective strategies), the type of anaesthesia and procedure, monitors in use, when and where the incident happened, the experience of the personnel involved, patient age and a classification of patient outcome. Enrolment, reporting and data-handling procedures are described. Data on patient outcome are presented; this is correlated with the stages at which the incident occurred and with the ASA status of the patients. The locations at which the incidents occurred and the types of procedures, the sets of incidents analysed in detail and a breakdown of the incidents due to drugs are also presented. The pattern and relative frequencies of the various categories of incidents are similar to those in "closed-claims" studies, suggesting that AIMS should provide information of relevance to those wishing to develop strategies to reduce the incidence and/or impact of incidents and accidents.

Anaesthetists are called upon to manage complex life-threatening crises at a moment's notice. As there is evidence that this may require cognitive tasking beyond the information-processing capacity of the human brain, it was decided to try and develop a generic crisis management algorithm analogous to the "Phase I" immediate response routine used by airline pilots. Such an algorithm, based on the mnemonic "COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK'; was developed and refined over 3 meetings, each attended by 60-100 anaesthetists and aviation psychologists. It was validated against 1301 relevant incidents among the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. It proved sufficiently robust and safe to recommend its general use as an initial response to any incident or crisis which occurs when a patient is breathing gas from an anaesthetic machine. It requires a limited knowledge base and is easily learnt and rehearsed during the anaesthetist's working day. It will provide a functional diagnosis in over 99% of cases and will correct 62% of the problems in 40-60 seconds. In the remaining 37% it will allow the anaesthetist to proceed with a "sub-algorithm'; confident in the knowledge that some important step has not been missed. In just over 30% of incidents this will be for a problem familiar to all anaesthetists (e.g. laryngospasm, bradycardia); in just over 6% it will be for a less common, more complex, but finite, set of problems (3 % cardiac arrest, 1% air embolism, 1% anaphylaxis, 1% for the remaining desaturations); in less than 1% diagnosis and correction will require a more complex checklist (e.g. for malignant hyperthermia, pneumothorax). The next stage, the development of specific sub-algorithms and a structured team approach for ongoing problems, is in progress.

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the incidence and circumstances of problems with endotracheal intubation; 85 (4%) indicated difficulties with intubation. One third of these were emergency cases, one third involved an initially unassisted trainee and one fifth were outside normal working hours. Failure to predict a difficult intubation was reported in one third of the cases, with another quarter presenting serious difficulty despite preoperative prediction. Difficulties with ventilation were experienced in 1 in 7 of the 85 reports; there was one cardiac arrest, but no death. Endotracheal intubation was not achieved in one fifth of the cases. The commonest complications reported amongst the 85 incidents were oesophageal intubation (18 cases), arterial desaturation (15 cases), and reflux of gastric contents (7 cases). Emergency trans-tracheal airways were required in 5 cases. Obesity, limited neck mobility and mouth opening, and inadequate assistance together accounted for two thirds of all the contributing factors. The most successful intubation aid in this series was a gum elastic bougie. A capnograph contributed to management in 28% and a pulse oximeter in 12% of the cases in which they were used. The most serious desaturations were associated with accidental oesophageal intubation. These data suggest a lack of reliable preoperative assessment techniques and skills for the prediction of difficult intubations. They also suggest the need for a greater emphasis on ensuring that the necessary equipment is available, and on teaching and learning drills for difficult intubation and any associated difficulty with ventilation.