SYNOPSIS Accounting scholars theorize that audit price is a function of a client's audit and business risk. Existing research finds that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance improves financial reporting quality (Matsunaga, Wang, and Yeung 2013), increases profitability, and reduces the likelihood of firm failure (Custodio and Metzger 2014). These factors suggest that auditors' engagement risk decreases when incumbent CEOs possess financial expertise, raising the likelihood that auditors will charge these firms lower fees. In this study, we examine whether CEOs' work experience in accounting- and finance-related jobs affects audit fees. Using a panel of U.S. firms between 2004 and 2013, we find that firms that have a financial expert CEO pay lower audit fees. Our results are robust to various specifications, including firm-fixed effect model and specifications that control for other CEO- and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)-specific and audit committee characteristics. Our findings thus add to the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of a functional background of top managers and how this background can create value for a firm through savings in audit fees.

Purpose Recent studies document that approximately two-thirds of sample firms have at least one audit committee member serving on their compensation committee (Liao and Hsu, 2013). Prior studies on overlap membership document that presence of audit committee members on compensation committee affects the reporting quality. Since auditors’ audit risk is affected by reporting quality. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the auditors perceive the overlap of audit and compensation committee members when pricing audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The author use a sample from 2007 to 2012 and run an OLS regression. Findings The author find a negative association between overlap membership and audit fees. The results are robust after controlling for selection bias, alternate measurement of overlap membership, and an alternate pre- and post-overlap membership test. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between overlap membership and audit fees is explained by lower audit risk and not by lower brand premium of non-Big4 auditors and that the benefit of overlapping membership increases when the audit committee size is large. Practical implications The findings suggest that firms with large audit committee can improve their reporting and lower their audit fees by having audit committee members on compensation committee. Originality/value The findings contribute to the literature on the consequences of overlap membership and on the ongoing debate about the extent that common membership enhances audit committee monitoring. It also adds to the limited literature on audit committee and audit pricing.

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SUMMARY Prior studies have examined the effect of a decline in the auditor's or client's reputation on auditor switching, market shares, and stock prices. We extend these studies by examining the effect of an unexpected increase in a client's reputation on audit fees at the office level. We argue that association with a reputed client will enhance the auditor's reputation and establish a brand name, thus enabling the auditor to charge higher fees from other clients. Using a client's inclusion into the prestigious S&P 500 index as a proxy for the client's change in reputation, we find that the audit fees are discounted for this S&P client when it enters the index. The audit fee for this client increases following its exit from the index. We posit that changes in the audit fees for the S&P 500 clients are attributable to the changes in the reporting quality of these firms following their entry to and exit from the index. We also find increases in the audit fees of non-S&P clients of the audit office around such events. We argue that the presence of S&P clients helps auditors differentiate themselves from other auditors and allows them to extract rents from non-S&P clients. Last, we find no evidence of improvement in the reporting quality of other non-S&P clients, supporting our rent-extraction story.