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This paper explores implications of language translation in accounting. It draws on research on translation in other disciplines, and on insights from applied linguistics. It examines practical problems and solutions explored in other disciplines that we deem relevant to accounting. The paper also examines ideological, cultural, legal and political consequences of translation. We find that the ambiguity inherent in translation is, on the one hand, relevant for the translation of accounting principles and can contribute to accounting convergence. We show, on the other hand, that it has the potential to be exploited in ideologically or pragmatically motivated distortions in the implementation of accounting regulation. We further argue that the importance of translation in accounting is underestimated or disregarded, inter alia because it has limited effect on the culturally and economically most dominant stakeholders. We finally examine implications of translation problems for less powerful stakeholders and smaller language communities.

This research demonstrates how sustained charity fraud is supported when organisations do not develop strong accountability links to salient stakeholders. Whilst increased regulation is one response to reduce charity fraud and to increase organisational accountability, regulators seldom recognise the myriad heterogeneous needs of stakeholders. This research explores the tactics employed by beneficiaries and the donating public to escalate their accountability demands on such charities. By preferring the most powerful stakeholders, charities miss the opportunity to design effective processes to discharge accountability to meet their moral obligations to legitimate stakeholders. This article calls for increased 'stakeholder understanding' by charity governors as a policy to recognise the moral rights of these stakeholders and to reduce charity transgressions.Résumé Cette étude démontre comment la poursuite de la fraude liée aux organismes de bienfaisance est encouragée lorsque les organisations ne développent pas de liens de responsabilisation forts avec les principaux partenaires. Tandis que l'accroissement de la réglementation fait partie des réponses à apporter pour réduire la fraude liée aux associations caritatives et augmenter la responsabilisation des organisations, les autorités de régulation prennent rarement conscience des multiples besoins hétérogènes des parties prenantes. Cette étude décrit les tactiques employées par les bénéficiaires et le public donateur pour donner un degré de priorité plus élevé aux demandes de responsabilisation qui incombe à ces oeuvres de bienfaisance. En donnant la préférence aux parties prenantes les plus puissantes, les associations caritatives manquent d'élaborer des processus efficaces pour s'acquitter de la responsabilité de satisfaire à leurs obligations morales à l'égard des partenaires légitimes. Ce rapport préconise une meilleure compréhension des parties prenantes par les administrateurs des associations caritatives en tant que ligne de conduite pour reconnaître les droits moraux de ces partenaires et réduire les infractions de la part des organismes de bienfaisance.Zusammenfassung Diese Studie legt dar, wie nachhaltiger Spendenbetrug mög-lich ist, wenn Organisationen kein gutes Rechenschaftsverhältnis zu ihren wichtigen Stakeholdern unterhalten. Eine Möglichkeit zur Eindämmung von Spendenbetrug und zur Erhöhung der organisatorischen Rechenschaftspflicht ist eine verstärkte Regulierung; doch werden in den Regelwerken selten die unzähligen verschiedenartigen Bedürfnisse der Stakeholder berücksichtigt. Die Studie untersucht die von den Spendenempfängern und Spendern angewandten Methoden zur Ausweitung ihrer Forderungen nach einer Rechenschaftspflicht seitens der Wohltätigkeitsor-ganisationen. Wenn Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen die einflussreichsten Stakeholder begünstigen, versäumen sie die Gelegenheit, effektive Verfahren zum Nachkommen ihrer Rechenschaftspflicht und ihrer moralen Verpflichtungen gegenüber legitimen Stakeholdern zu entwickeln. Dieser Beitrag fordert vo...

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Criticism of auditors and loss of confidence in their work result from auditors not meeting society's expectations of them; that is, from the audit expectation‐performance gap. Prior research found this gap has three components: a reasonableness, deficient standards and deficient performance gap. In 2008, research was conducted to identify differences in the audit expectation‐performance gap in the United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand (NZ). A questionnaire was mailed to 1,610 participants in the UK and 1,555 in NZ, from the auditor, auditee and financial and non‐financial audit beneficiaries interest groups; usable response rates of 14 and 29 per cent, respectively, were obtained. The research found that the composition and structure of the gap in NZ and the UK were broadly similar but the gap was nearly 40 per cent wider in NZ. It is suggested that this difference may be traced to greater awareness of audit issues and more stringent monitoring of auditors' performance in the UK.