From a study of stopping antiprotons in a variety of elements located in a hydrogen bubble chamber, we find evidence for the existence of a neutron fringe in heavy nuclei.

No abstract

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Political Economy.A three-factor model of a small country or region is used to analyze the general equilibrium consequences of three frequently advocated regional development policies-investment subsidies, migration incentives, and educational expenditures. The analysis focuses on policy-induced changes in absolute and relative factor earnings. The results link changes in the distribution of income to the degree of complementarity and substitutability among factors of production and to the pricing scheme adopted by educational institutions. Programs intended to aid lagging regions may produce perverse results, particularly if the cost of education is the same to all individuals regardless of ability.The existence of mobile factors has important consequences for the effectiveness of regional development policies. Increased mobility of capital and skilled labor has substantially altered the possibilities of achieving social and economic objectives through allocational incentives. Moreover, policies designed to promote these objectives may generate unintended distributional shifts as a result of induced factor flows.'In this paper, a one-sector model of a small country or region is used to analyze the general equilibrium consequences of three frequently advocated regional development policies-investment subsidies, migration incentives, and educational expenditures. The analysis focuses on policyinduced changes in absolute and relative factor earnings.2 Capital is The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation grant no. SOC74-19459. Christopher Clague, Frank Flatters, Edwin Truman, and anonymous referees provided useful comments on earlier drafts. 1 See, esp., Cooper 1968 and 1974. 2 Most other writers have emphasized changes in total or per capita income rather than its distribution among factors; see, e.g., Johnson 1967; one exception is Mishan and Needleman 1968. However, possibilities for redistribution of income are generally limited, so that changes in factor earnings are an important policy concern.8o JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY treated as perfectly mobile, an assumption suggested by the growing importance of interregional and international investment flows. Skilled labor is assumed to be mobile within limits imposed by the costs of migration; unskilled labor is assumed to be immobile. The decision to treat only skilled labor as mobile is motivated by current immigration regulations in the United States and some other developed countries, which effectively limit immigration to those with needed skills. Even within developed economies...

Most-favored-nation treatment, i.e., nondiscrimination among trading partners, is a fundamental principle of the GATT/WTO system. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards has thus been seen as encouraging use of a preferred form of contingent protection relative to antidumping and other inherently discriminatory measures. In practice, however, safeguard protection may also incorporate discriminatory elements. This paper focuses on three ways that policies conforming to the Agreement on Safeguards may nonetheless discriminate explicitly or implicitly among trading partners. First, the form of the safeguard policy matters : quantitative restrictions discriminate among foreign suppliers by preserving historical market shares more than a safeguard implemented as a tariff. Second, safeguard measures discriminate against faster-growing exporters and new entrants in import markets. Third, formal exemptions for partners in preferential trade agreements and for small developing-country suppliers allow these countries to gain market share at the expense of non-exempted exporters. We provide evidence of these discriminatory effects in actual cases of safeguard protection.

No abstract