Past research has established a connection between regret (negative emotions connected to cognitions about how past actions might have achieved better outcomes) and both depression and anxiety. in the present research, the relations between regret, repetitive thought, depression, and anxiety were examined in a nationally representative telephone survey. although both regret and repetitive thought were associated with general distress, only regret was associated with anhedonic depression and anxious arousal. Further, the interaction between regret and repetitive thought (i.e., repetitive regret) was highly predictive of general distress but not of anhedonic depression nor anxious arousal. these relations were strikingly consistent across demographic variables such as sex, race/ethnicity, age, education, and income. we acknowledge the services of marni Basic, Jane Burris, and Jennifer parsons at the survey Research laboratory at the university of illinois. we thank howard Berenbaum, wendy heller, gregory miller, and susan mineka for conceptual input into this research. this research was supported by national institute of mental health grant R01-mh055578, awarded to neal Roese.

People often ponder what might have been, and these counterfactual inferences have been linked to behavior regulation. Counterfactuals may enhance performance by either a content-specific pathway (via shift in behavioral intentions) and/or a content-neutral pathway (via mindsets or motivation). Three experiments provided new specification of the content-specific pathway. A sequential priming paradigm revealed that counterfactual judgments facilitated RTs to complete behavioral intention judgments relative to control judgments and to a no-judgment baseline (Experiment 1). This facilitation effect was found only for intention judgments that matched the information content of the counterfactual (Experiment 2) and only for intention judgments as opposed to a different judgment that nevertheless focused on the same information content (Experiment 3). These findings clarify the content-specific pathway by which counterfactuals influence behavior.

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Functional counterfactual thinking involves a unique set of circumstances where one can both reflect on past events and imagine future possibilities. A key aspect of a counterfactual's functionality is that insight about past mistakes is converted into plans for future action, thereby improving self‐regulatory success. If counterfactual thinking is a self‐regulatory tool, then it should be similarly impacted by psychological mechanisms that influence peoples' ability to improve future outcomes. The current research tested one such mechanism, psychological distance. Using a sequential priming paradigm, Experiment 1 showed that functional counterfactual thinking is sensitive to changes in temporal distance. Negative events in the recent versus distant past facilitated relevant behavioral intention judgments. Additionally, functional counterfactual thinking was sensitive to changes in the relevant behavioral intention's temporal distance, such that counterfactual judgments facilitated behavioral intentions set to occur in the near but not distant future (Experiment 2). Together, this research creates new connections between functional counterfactual thinking and psychological distance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Schizophrenia has been associated with impairment of counterfactual thinking (Hooker et al., 2000), defined as cognitions about alternatives to past outcomes (i.e., what might have been). Counterfactual thinking in healthy individuals is associated with effective problem-solving, behavioral regulation, and performance improvement (Camille et al., 2004; Ursu & Carter, 2005; Roese, 1997). Specifically, counterfactual thinking (e.g., "If only I had studied harder") contributes to behavior regulation via activation of intentions (e.g., "Next exam I will study harder"), which in turn elicit corresponding behavior (e.g., studying; see Figure 1). All three causal links in Figure 1 have been verified among healthy participants (Smallman & Roese, 2006). In schizophrenia patients, link 1 is impaired (Hooker et al., 2000), whereas link 3 is intact (Brandstätter et al., 2001). The present research examined whether impairment of link 2 (from counterfactuals to intentions) is associated with schizophrenia.