The authors offer a critical examination of the claims of the proponents of the growing neuropsychoanalytic trend, that neuroscientific findings are relevant and important for the development and justification of psychoanalytic theory and practice. They bring to light some of the intuitions that have led to the popularity of the neuropsychoanalytic claims and the fallacies that underlie these claims and intuitions. They argue that it is crucial at this time to articulate the case against the neuropsychoanalytic trend because, underlying the debate over the relevance of neuroscience to psychoanalysis, there lies a struggle over the essential nature of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Relying on a biologistic perspective, whereby only what is biological is real, this new trend in effect offers a vision of psychoanalysis that limits the significance of the unique psychoanalytic concern with the understanding of meanings and the role of discourse in discerning and justifying these meanings.

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Various theories of psychological development can be characterized according to whether they are primarily separation or attachment theories and whether they emphasize primarily the processes or the products of development. A full understanding of psychological development requires an integration of theories of attachment and separation and of what is attained in the course of psychological development (the products), as well as the mechanisms (or processes) by which these products are attained. Discussion of a revised model of Erikson's eight stages of psychosocial development illustrates the importance of formulating a dialectical developmental model that describes the interaction between attachment and separation and between product and process.

This paper is concerned with the value of the act of defining the field of psychoanalysis. It examines the reasons why adopting and especially giving voice to a definition that excludes approaches considered by some analysts to be analytic is commonly regarded as unacceptable within psychoanalytic discourse. It then explains the value and advantages of putting forth exclusive definitions. The author argues that clarifying the pros and cons of such acts of definition contributes to the understanding of the nature of psychoanalysis and the possibility of dialogue between opposing understandings of it. It may also contribute to greater freedom of thought and expression which is essential to the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice.

In this paper the author critically examines the nature of the positive, reconciliatory attitude towards religion that has become increasingly prevalent within psychoanalytic thinking and writing over the past 20 years. She shows how this positive attitude rests on a change in the nature of the prototype of religion and its reassignment to the realm of illusion, thus making irrelevant an issue most central both to psychoanalysis and to traditional Judeo‐Christian belief ‐ the passionate search for truth. The author demonstrates how the concern with truth, and specifically with the truth of religious claims, lies at the basis of the opposition between psychoanalysis and religion but, paradoxically, also provides the common ground for dialogue between the two. She argues that, as Freud developed his ideas regarding the origin of conviction in religious claims in his Moses and monotheism (1939), the nature of this common ground was expanded and the dialogue became potentially more meaningful. The author concludes that meaningful dialogue emerges through recognition of fundamental differences rather than through harmonisation within a realm of illusion. In this light, the present study may also be seen as an attempt to recognise fundamental differences that have been evolving within psychoanalysis itself.