The purpose of this article is to argue for the deconstruction rather than the decolonisation of the neocolonial curriculum. Globalisation facilitates the democratisation of higher education, which is now accessible to more people than ever before, but globalisation also facilitates the expansion of the ideological dominance of the Global North over the Global South by means of the neocolonial curriculum. Contemporary attempts to decolonise Global South curricula are proceeding very slowly. We propose an alternative, the deconstruction of the Global North curriculum, i.e. a radical change to the Global North curriculum that exploits the neoliberal imperative to maximise profit in order to undermine the neocolonial curriculum. We use two case studies-Frantz Fanon and Çiğdem Kağitçibaşi to demonstrate how the deconstruction of the Global North curriculum can be achieved, by the prioritisation of theory and practice that are sensitive to context.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the value interaction debate is deeply flawed and constitutes a superficial analysis of the relationship between morality and art. I introduce the debate, which concerns whether a moral defect in a work of art is (also) an aesthetic defect, in §1. §2 establishes the vagueness of two key terms in the discussion, moral defects and aesthetic defects. In §3 I introduce the naive assumption-uninteresting claim disjunction, identifying five of the six approaches as demonstrating a fundamental naivety about the relationship between morality and narrative art. I show, in §4, that four of the six are philosophically uninteresting as they offer an incomplete-and ultimately unsatisfactoryexplanation of this relationship. In §5 I discuss the quantity and quality of examples employed in the debate, many of which are non-canonical, and some of which are entirely inappropriate. I conclude by recommending a reorientation of the debate to focus on the underlying question of whether the characteristically artistic value is finally or instrumentally valuable. precursors to the contemporary discussion, 2 but the value interaction debate was initiated by Noël Carroll with "Moderate Moralism" in 1996, 3 followed closely by contributions from Daniel Jacobson 4 and Matthew Kieran. 5 The debate is concerned with the interaction of moral value and aesthetic value in art, understood in terms of the relationship between moral defects and merits on the one hand, and aesthetic defects and merits on the other. 6 I shall characterise the discussion in terms of the following pair of statements: (1) A moral defect in a work of art is (also) an aesthetic defect. (2) A moral merit in a work of art is (also) an aesthetic merit. Broadly speaking, a moralist position supports (1) and (2)-and thus value interaction-and an autonomist position denies (1) and (2), holding that the two types of value are independent of each other. The focus of the debate has been on (1), and I shall follow suit in this paper. The dispute has primarily been concerned with moral and aesthetic defects in works of narrative art, with examples typically drawn from literature and film. A.W. Eaton's initial contribution to the debate, on the relation between the moral defects and aesthetic defects of Titian's Rape of Europa, is a notable exception, but her discussion of the different ways in which works of pictorial art and literary art call for affective responses confirms the 2 The following three are particularly relevant: Kendall Walton, "Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality I,"

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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the experience of a poem qua poem is an experience of poetic thickness, i.e. an experience in which poetic form and poetic content are inseparable. I present a critical analysis of A.C. Bradley's "Poetry for Poetry's Sake" lecture in §1, indicating both the strengths and weaknesses of his conception of resonant meaning. §2 draws on subsequent work by I.A. Richards and Peter Lamarque to advance my account of the relationship in question, poetic thickness, understood as a demand made of a poem rather than a property discovered therein. In § §3-6 I discuss four objections to form-content unity from Peter Kivy: perfect circularity, ubiquitous unity, the sugar-coated pill tradition, and the defence from tradition. I show that all these objections fail against poetic thickness. I conclude that the experience of a poem qua poem is indeed an experience of thickness, and that poetic thickness is therefore a necessary condition of poetry.

Narrative Justice presents an argument for a contemporary theory of aesthetic education, followed by examples of that theory in practice. I use aesthetic education in its strict philosophical sense, that is, as a thesis about the relationship between aesthetic or artistic value on the one hand and moral and political value on the other hand. The crux of the thesis is that there is some kind of causal relation between aesthetic experiences and moral development. The term is ambiguous because an aesthetic education is not an education in aesthetics but an education by aesthetics, specifically a moral education by aesthetic means, which is, in turn, a means to the end of political education.