This book is about nature considered as the totality of physical existence, the universe. By physical we mean all phenomena -objects and processes -that are possible to detect either directly by our senses or via instruments. Historically, there have been many ways of describing the universe (cosmic egg, cosmic tree, theistic universe, mechanistic universe) while a particularly prominent contemporary approach is computational universe.One of the most important pioneers of computing, Turing, described by Hodges as natural philosopher, can be identified as a forerunner and founder of the notion of computing nature and natural computing through his morphological computing and "unorganized" (neural-network type) machines. Dodig-Crnkovic and Basti in this volume address Turing's role as a pioneer of natural computing. Present day computers are distinctly different from the early stand-alone calculating machines that Turing helped construct, designed to mechanize computation of mathematical functions. Computers today are networked and largely used for worldwide communication and variety of information processing and knowledge management. They are cognitive tools of extended mind used in social interactions and ever growing repositories of information. Moreover, computers play an important role in the control of physical processes and thus connect directly to the physical world, especially in automation, traffic control and robotics. Apart from classical engineering and hard-scientific domains, computing has in recent decades pervaded new fields such as biology and social sciences, humanities and arts -all previously considered as typical soft, non-mechanical and unautomatable domains.

Autonomy is the core of a lively debate on moral and political philosophy, where many competing perspectives and conceptual distinctions are presented. Several authors tend to override the metaphysical questions of determinism and free will: this is the right step for emphasizing the dimensions of individual choice as well as the role of socialization in developing capacities for critical reflection. In this context, the most important distinction is between "moral" autonomy and "personal" autonomy. Generally speaking, the theorists of personal autonomy try to give an account of autonomy that is conceived not only as moral agency. This move allows the consideration of several patterns of practical reasoning that imply several kinds of reasons for acting. The argumentation considers the discussion between "procedural" and "substantive" theories. Procedural theories emphasize the structural conditions of the process of "identification" with one's own motives. Even if these conditions are relevant, substantive theories rightly point to the role of the content of our reasons for autonomous agency. This perspective requires substantive standards according to which we can recognize and criticize oppressive norms. The main theoretical proposal of this work is to show the normative requirements for autonomy. An intersubjective model is promising if we consider socialization from the point of view of the process through which we develop the cognitive and moral capacities necessary for autonomy. The "scorekeeping" model, (an original variant of Wittgenstein's linguistic game as proposed by Robert Brandom) seems to offer the deontic structure of discursive practices in which the agents have the possibility of discussing and criticizing their own and others' reasons.

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The present contribution aims at investigating the relationship between habits and rituals; they are based on the same processes even though they have different functions depending on the context (personal or social). Our discussion will mostly focus on the nature and function of rituals, as necessary practices in human and other animals’ social lives. After a brief introduction of the notion of “habit” by reference to relevant studies that cross philosophy and neurobiology, we propose an interpretation of rituals as collective activity, which is based on the same mechanisms of habits formation, but it is expressed in a “We-form”, from which it is created and institutionalized

In the ambit of the debate on “personal autonomy”, we propose to intend “personal autonomy” in a social sense. We undertake this move because we think that autonomy is compatible with socialization and we will give reasons for this claim. Moreover, we must consider the role of the wide variety of informational sources we are exposed to that influence our behavior. Social background represents the ontological ground from which we develop the capacity for autonomy; at the same time, interaction with others (real or virtual) enlarges the possibility for autonomous judgements. Our attempt is, first, to try to sketch a social notion of personal autonomy and, second, to elucidate the connection between autonomy and the exposition to informational and social diversity.