Given their lack of background knowledge, laypeople require expert help when dealing with scientific information. To decide whose help is dependable, laypeople must judge an expert’s epistemic trustworthiness in terms of competence, adherence to scientific standards, and good intentions. Online, this may be difficult due to the often limited and sometimes unreliable source information available. To measure laypeople’s evaluations of experts (encountered online), we constructed an inventory to assess epistemic trustworthiness on the dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence. Exploratory (n = 237) and confirmatory factor analyses (n = 345) showed that the Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI) is composed of these three factors. A subsequent experimental study (n = 137) showed that all three dimensions of the METI are sensitive to variation in source characteristics. We propose using this inventory to measure assignments of epistemic trustworthiness, that is, all judgments laypeople make when deciding whether to place epistemic trust in–and defer to–an expert in order to solve a scientific informational problem that is beyond their understanding.

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This study indicates the possibility of changing domain-specific epistemological beliefs through a short-term intervention. However, it questions the stability and elaborateness of domain-specific epistemological beliefs, particularly when domain knowledge is shallow.

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Empirical studies reveal a close relationship between epistemological beliefs (EBs) and metacognition. For example, more 'sophisticated' beliefs are associated with more self-reported monitoring strategies. This relationship is also advocated theoretically. Nevertheless, exactly how and why EBs impact learning is still an open question. In accordance with others (for example Muis 2007; Muis and Franco 2009) we conceive the COPES Model (Winne and Hadwin 1998) as an appropriate answer to the how question. Within that model, epistemological beliefs are conceptualized as 'internal conditions of learning' and they are embedded into recursive processes of self-regulation. With regard to the why question, we assume that EBs function as general ideas about knowledge for the apprehension of the content to be learnt. Such apprehension allows for the calibration of learning to different learning tasks. We review two clusters of studies on the preparatory and the enactment stages of learning testing this apprehension and calibration hypothesis.