and participants in the Marketing Science conference in Ann Arbor. The authors also thank Ranga Venkatesan and Prerit Souda for assistance in data collection and analysis. This study benefited from a grant from Don Murray to the USC Marshall Center for Global Innovation. Greg Allenby served as associate editor for this article. Raj SethuRaman, GeRaRd j. telliS, and RichaRd a. BRieSch* the authors conduct a meta-analysis of 751 short-term and 402 longterm direct-to-consumer brand advertising elasticities estimated in 56 studies published between 1960 and 2008. the study finds several new empirical generalizations about advertising elasticity. the most important are as follows: the average short-term advertising elasticity is .12, which is substantially lower than the prior meta-analytic mean of .22; there has been a decline in the advertising elasticity over time; and advertising elasticity is higher (1) for durable goods than nondurable goods, (2) in the early stage than the mature stage of the life cycle, (3) for yearly data than quarterly data, and (4) when advertising is measured in gross rating points than monetary terms. the mean long-term advertising elasticity is .24, which is much lower than the implied mean in the prior metaanalysis (.41). many of the results for short-term elasticity hold for longterm elasticity, with some notable exceptions. the authors discuss the implications of these findings.

We present an analytical framework for understanding what makes a product category more conducive for store brand introduction. We also investigate market characteristics that help explain differences in store brand market share across product categories. Our findings suggest that the introduction of a store brand is likely to increase retailer's profits in a product category if the cross-price sensitivity among national brands is low and the cross-price sensitivity between the national brands and the store brand is high. Our model predicts that the store brand share would also be greater under these conditions. In addition, we find that the introduction of a store brand is more likely to lead to an increase in category profits if the category consists of a large number of national brands---even though the store brand market share is expected to be lower when there are a large number of national brands. We compare the key predictions of our model with data on 426 grocery product categories. The data are consistent with the predictions of the model.private labels, retailing, new product introduction, pricing, distribution channels, game theory

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Identifies some managerially relevant factors that influence the size of the price premium that consumers will pay for national brands over store brands in grocery products. We define price premium as the maximum price consumers will pay for a national brand over a store brand, expressed as the proportionate price differential between a national brand and a store brand. Overall, perceived quality differential accounts for about 12 percent of the variation in price premiums across consumers and product categories and is the most important variable influencing price premiums.

This paper provides some empirical generalizations regarding how the relative prices of competing brands affect the cross-price effects among them. Particular focus is on the asymmetric price effect and the neighborhood price effect. The asymmetric price effect states that a price promotion by a higher-priced brand affects the market share of a lower-priced brand more so than the reverse. The neighborhood price effect states that brands that are closer to each other in price have larger cross-price effects than brands that are priced farther apart. The main objective of this paper is to test if these two effects are generalizable across product categories, and to assess which of these two effects is stronger. While the neighborhood price effect has not been rigorously tested in past research, the asymmetric price effect has been validated by several researchers. However, these tests of asymmetric price effect have predominantly used elasticity as the measure of cross-price effect. The cross-price elasticity measures the percentage change in market share (or sales) of a brand for 1% change in price of a competing brand. We show that asymmetries in cross-price elasticities tend to favor the higher-priced brand simply because of scaling effects due to considering percentage changes. Furthermore, several researchers have used logit models to infer asymmetric patterns. We also show that inferring asymmetries from conventional logit models is incorrect. To account for potential scaling effects, we consider the absolute cross-price effect defined as the change in market share (percentage) points of a target brand when a competing brand's price changes by one percent of the product category price. The advantage of this measure is that it is dimensionless (hence comparable across categories) and it avoids scaling effects. We show that in the logit model with arbitrary heterogeneity in brand preferences and price sensitivities, the absolute cross-price effect is symmetric. We develop an econometric model for simultaneously estimating the asymmetric and neighborhood price effects and assess their relative strengths. We also estimate two alternate models that address the following questions: (i) If I were managing the th highest priced brand, which brand do I impact the most by discounting and which brand hurts me the most through price discounts? (ii) Who hurts whom in National Brand vs. Store Brand competition? Based on a meta-analysis of 1,060 cross-price effects on 280 brands from 19 different grocery product categories, we provide the following empirical generalizations: 1. The asymmetric price effect holds with cross-price elasticities, but tends to disappear with absolute cross-price effects. 2. The neighborhood price effect holds with both cross-price elasticities and absolute cross-price effects, and is significantly stronger than the asymmetric price effect on both measures of cross-price effects. 3. A brand is affected the most by discounts of its immediately higher-priced brand, followed closely by discounts of i...