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Abstract. In order to ensure trusted in-field operation of integrated circuits, it is important to develop efficient low-cost techniques to detect malicious tampering (also referred to as Hardware Trojan) that causes undesired change in functional behavior. Conventional postmanufacturing testing, test generation algorithms and test coverage metrics cannot be readily extended to hardware Trojan detection. In this paper, we propose a test pattern generation technique based on multiple excitation of rare logic conditions at internal nodes. Such a statistical approach maximizes the probability of inserted Trojans getting triggered and detected by logic testing, while drastically reducing the number of vectors compared to a weighted random pattern based test generation. Moreover, the proposed test generation approach can be effective towards increasing the sensitivity of Trojan detection in existing side-channel approaches that monitor the impact of a Trojan circuit on power or current signature. Simulation results for a set of ISCAS benchmarks show that the proposed test generation approach can achieve comparable or better Trojan detection coverage with about 85% reduction in test length on average over random patterns.

Malicious modification of hardware during design or fabrication has emerged as a major security concern. Such tampering (also referred to as Hardware Trojan) causes an integrated circuit (IC) to have altered functional behavior, potentially with disastrous consequences in safety-critical applications. Conventional design-time verification and post-manufacturing testing cannot be readily extended to detect hardware Trojans due to their stealthy nature, inordinately large number of possible instances and large variety in structure and operating mode. In this paper, we analyze the threat posed by hardware Trojans and the methods of deterring them. We present a Trojan taxonomy, models of Trojan operations and a review of the state-of-the-art Trojan prevention and detection techniques. Next, we discuss the major challenges associated with this security concern and future research needs to address them.Index Terms-Hardware Trojan; Design for Security; 978-1-4244-4823-4/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE

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Security features are of paramount importance for the Internet of Things (IoT), and implementations are challenging given the resource-constrained IoT setup. We have developed a lightweight identity-based cryptosystem suitable for IoT to enable secure authentication and message exchange among the devices. Our scheme employs a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) to generate the public identity of each device, which is used as the public key for each device for message encryption. We have provided formal proofs of security in the Session Key Security and Universally Composable Framework of the proposed protocol, which demonstrates the resilience of the scheme against passive and active attacks. We have demonstrated the setup required for the protocol implementation and shown that the proposed protocol implementation incurs low hardware and software overhead.